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ARTICLES
THE  ALGORITHM  GAME
Jane Bambauer* & Tal Zarsky**
Most of the discourse on algorithmic decisionmaking, whether it comes in the form of praise
or warning, assumes that algorithms apply to a static world.  But automated decisionmaking is
a dynamic process.  Algorithms attempt to estimate some difficult-to-measure quality about a
subject using proxies, and the subjects in turn change their behavior in order to game the system
and get a better treatment for themselves (or, in some cases, to protest the system.)  These behav-
ioral changes can then prompt the algorithm to make corrections.  The moves and countermoves
create a dance that has great import to the fairness and efficiency of a decision-making process.
And this dance can be structured through law.  Yet existing law lacks a clear policy vision or
even a coherent language to foster productive debate.
This Article provides the foundation.  We describe gaming and countergaming strategies
using credit scoring, employment markets, criminal investigation, and corporate reputation man-
agement as key examples.  We then show how the law implicitly promotes or discourages these
behaviors, with mixed effects on accuracy, distributional fairness, efficiency, and autonomy.
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INTRODUCTION
Modern life is judgmental.  For any modern person or business, scarcely
a day goes by without some experience of being assessed and differentiated
from their peers.  Some of these judgments are relatively trivial, as when
Google decides which ads to serve to which end users.  But others are conse-
quential and profoundly personal.  They are carried out by both government
and private entities, as when employers decide who to hire and how much to
pay them, when creditors decide what interest rate to offer on a loan, when
police officers decide who to search, or when dating websites decides who to
recommend for courtship.  Differentiating between people in order to allo-
cate scarce resources is not new, but these assessments are increasingly made
with the help of automated predictions based on exhaustive information col-
lected from a variety of sources.
The shift from more organic, subjective, and noisy human-based deci-
sion-making processes to mechanical ones has motivated a large, diverse, and
critical literature.  Scholars have identified many problems that algorithmic
decisionmaking can introduce or exacerbate, including opacity,1 lack of
accountability,2 power imbalances,3 discriminatory effects,4 hassle to the peo-
1 See FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CON-
TROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 6–7 (2015).
2 See Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 638 (2017).
3 See PASQUALE, supra note 1, at 3–4.
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ple being judged,5 indignity from being treated by a machine,6 the lack of
due process,7 and an insatiable appetite for surveillance.8  But so far, the
legal literature has focused on the effects of algorithms in static mode.  The
policy literature has largely assumed that algorithmic systems dictate a score,
and individuals accept the results.9  This simplification is useful for initial
exploration, but much can be learned by dispensing of it.  Life is dynamic,
and individuals change their behavior in anticipation of how they are judged
and what the consequences will be.  Within limits, people game the system
for a range of altruistic and self-serving reasons.  And algorithm designers
game right back, using countermoves to discourage gaming or to reduce its
effects.
Some scholars have analyzed particular aspects of gaming.  Finn Brun-
ton and Helen Nissenbaum have given a definition and rationale for obfusca-
tion—that is, principled resistance and sabotage of assessment systems.10
Rush Atkinson has explored how suspicion factors used to justify police stops
and searches wind up altering human behavior.11  Joshua Kroll and his coau-
thors have acknowledged that data subjects can engage in strategic behavior
that could render algorithm transparency undesirable even if it were possible
4 See CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INE-
QUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY (2016); see also Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst,
Essay, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 673–74 (2016).
5 See Jane Bambauer, Hassle, 113 MICH. L. REV. 461 (2015).
6 See Kiel Brennan-Marquez, “Plausible Cause”: Explanatory Standards in the Age of Power-
ful Machines, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1249, 1252 (2017).
7 Deirdre K. Mulligan & Kenneth A. Bamberger, Saving Governance-by-Design, 106
CALIF. L. REV. 697, 719 (2018).
8 See Margaret Hu, Small Data Surveillance v. Big Data Cybersurveillance, 42 PEPP. L. REV.
773, 774 (2015) (discussing how to properly approach and analyze the “rapidly evolving
bulk metadata and mass data surveillance methods that increasingly rely upon data science
and big data’s algorithmic, analytic, and integrative tools”).
9 Even computer scientists can underestimate the importance of dynamic gaming
processes when they assume that the exploit phase of an algorithm will encounter the same
type of data as the explore phase.  However, the field of “mechanism design” is premised
on the notions of building systems while acknowledging that others will strive to game
them. See generally Mechanism Design, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mecha-
nism_design (last visited Aug. 8, 2018).  In addition, in the machine learning context,
experts have acknowledged that attempts to game the learning system might compromise
the learning process by influencing it.  The discipline has learned to design systems that
anticipate and mitigate this threat; by (among other tactics) randomizing parts of the pro-
cess. See Marco Barreno et al., Can Machine Learning Be Secure?, ASIACCS ’06, at 16–25
(2006), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/5f19/8e9f1a6cace1fcee5ec53f5d35d9d83af6b7
.pdf; see also discussion of “Adversarial Machine Learning,” infra note 14.
10 FINN BRUNTON & HELEN NISSENBAUM, OBFUSCATION: A USER’S GUIDE FOR PRIVACY
AND PROTEST 1 (2015).
11 L. Rush Atkinson, The Bilateral Fourth Amendment and the Duties of Law-Abiding Persons,
99 GEO. L.J. 1517, 1519–21 (2011). Atkinson seems to assume that many of these suspicion
factors are very elastic, causing people to change their behavior to avoid even the low costs
of experiencing a fruitless search. See id. at 1521–24.
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(which they doubt).12  Computer scientists and business school professors
have noted the perverse incentives that algorithms can create for motivated
stakeholders.13  More recently, computer scientists have developed the area
of “Adversarial Machine Learning,” which acknowledges the ability of adver-
saries to cause machine learning systems to make predictable errors and
exploit them.14  Scholars in the field of surveillance studies, including Gary
Marx, have discussed various ways in which surveillance could be gamed and
avoided.15  But this paper is, we believe, the first to give sustained attention to
gaming in all its forms.
The legal literature has developed very little in the way of theory that can
help determine whether a person’s ability to exploit the proxies used to
judge him is normatively desirable.  Nevertheless, existing law has frequently
parachuted in, sometimes to support an individual’s right to game the sys-
tem, and sometimes to quash it.  Existing law lacks a clear policy vision, or
even a coherent language to foster a productive debate.  This Article provides
the language and vision.  It identifies the competing values at stake in the
algorithm game so that the law can be thoughtfully designed to promote the
ones that are most important to policymakers.
Part I begins by defining gaming and setting out some assumptions.  We
then describe the gaming moves—tactics that people use to manipulate an
algorithm’s decisions, and the countertactics that algorithm designers use in
response.  The subjects of an algorithm can use avoidance, alteration, and
obfuscation to exploit or confuse the algorithm.  In response, an algorithmic
designer can reduce transparency, or he can alter the decision-making model
by collecting more data, making the model more complex, rapidly changing
the model as it is used, or using less mutable factors.
In Part II, we identify four values that are affected by the algorithm
game.  Gaming can enhance the autonomy of those who do it by giving them
some control over the measure by which they will be judged.  Gaming and
resisting computer processing can be understood as an exercise of liberty
and autonomy, and by the same logic, countermoves used by algorithm
designers can interfere with the ability to exercise those rights.  But even if it
enhances autonomy, gaming will often reduce the accuracy of a proxy since a
gameable algorithm can more readily lead to the suboptimal distribution of
12 Kroll et al., supra note 2, at 639; see also Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Com-
pliance: Risk and Regulation in a Digital Age, 88 TEX. L. REV. 669, 714 (2010) (recognizing
static systems can allow users to successfully trick them). But see Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure with Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417,
1454–56 (2014) (addressing the risks of strategic behavior, yet concluding they do not
generate a substantial challenge to their paper’s main premise).
13 BRIAN CHRISTIAN & TOM GRIFFITHS, ALGORITHMS TO LIVE BY: THE COMPUTER SCIENCE
OF HUMAN DECISIONS 157–58 (2016) (describing V.F. Ridgway’s work on the topic from the
1950s).
14 See Ryan Calo et al., Is Tricking a Robot Hacking? 6–9 (Univ. of Wash. Sch. of Law,
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2018-05, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3150530.
15 Gary T. Marx, A Tack in the Shoe: Neutralizing and Resisting the New Surveillance, 59 J.
SOC. ISSUES 369, 375–77 (2003).
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resources.  At the extreme, if gaming causes so much error that the results
are arbitrary or capricious, it can cause the algorithm to fail minimum stan-
dards of fairness.  The algorithm game also has important yet unintuitive dis-
tributional consequences.  Some populations will be less willing or able to
engage in gaming, and therefore both gaming and countermoves can have
disparate effects on different subgroups.  Finally, gaming can cause system
inefficiency since the moves and countermoves take time, effort, and
resources.16
Part III describes the legal landscape.  Existing U.S. law tacitly promotes
and demotes these values in various contexts.  For example, the law some-
times facilitates gaming and frustrates algorithmic countermoves by requir-
ing that decision-making processes be transparent, by limiting the use of
certain immutable and statistically useful proxies, and by restricting the type
or amount of information that can be collected about a subject.  Labor,
credit, and insurance law share many of these rules.  These types of laws
honor the autonomy value, but the implications for accuracy and distribu-
tional effects will depend on context.  In other areas, U.S. law dampens gam-
ing by compelling the disclosure of truthful information about a subject or by
prohibiting avoidance.  These laws, which are common in the areas of tax
and criminal investigation, are probably meant to promote accuracy.  But
because the priority of these competing values is latent, the public policy
debates are contentious and imprecise.
This Article hopes to add clarity to the debates about the proper role of
algorithmic decisionmaking during these early years of big data innovation
and regulation.  The project’s emphasis is taxonomical; our goal is to
describe and organize the stakes involved without setting a priority between
incompatible values.  Thus, although we illustrate the concepts by applying
them to specific examples such as credit scoring and criminal investigation,
we make only modest policy recommendations.
I. THE GAME
This Part lays the necessary groundwork for a deeper discussion of the
law and ethics of algorithm design in light of gaming.  Because it was too
perfect to resist, we borrow a line from Public Enemy to separate our discus-
sion into three Sections: “What is game,” “Who got game,” and “Where’s the
game in life?”17  These Sections will define gaming, comment on who will do
it (and why that matters), and provide a nonexhaustive set of tactics that can
be used to exploit or confuse an algorithm as well as the countertactics that
an algorithm producer may use in response.
16 These are additional inefficiencies beyond the costs from having less accurate
results.
17 With apologies to Public Enemy from two geeky fans. PUBLIC ENEMY, He Got Game,
on HE GOT GAME (Def Jam Recordings 1998).
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A. What Is Game?
Gaming is intimately related to the use of proxies and estimators in deci-
sion-making processes, so we begin our discussion there.  Decisions about
scarce resources and penalties can be made in one of only two ways: by pool-
ing potential recipients and distributing the resource using a neutral (or
seemingly neutral) factor such as queues or lotteries, or by discriminating
between them.  The diversity visa lottery, for example, is a pooling system
because it awards visas by randomly selecting a set number of visa applicants
from a particular country.18  A discriminating system would not use random
selection, equal apportion, or queues.  Instead, a discriminating factor could
be premised on the individual’s merit, need, or skill.19
Pooling schemes are designed to treat all subjects in the pool the same
without assessing the merits or costs associated with any person in the pool.
Pooling would be unremarkable for homogenous pools, where everyone is
more or less interchangeable.  But pooling is also frequently applied to heter-
ogeneous populations and reflects implicit policy choices to treat distinguish-
able people the same.  For example, by prohibiting health insurers from
considering preexisting health conditions when defining the terms and price
of a health plan, the Affordable Care Act requires insurers to ignore factors
that would be very relevant to predicted medical costs.20  By doing so, it con-
verted health insurance from a discrimination scheme to a pooling scheme.
Even though we know ex ante that the pool could be separated into higher
risk and lower risk subpools, the law forces the low-risk pool to cross-subsidize
the high-risk pool in order to more broadly spread the costs of care for
patients who are ill (or are predisposed to become ill).
In contrast to pooling, discrimination schemes do not treat all subjects
the same.  Discrimination schemes attempt to allocate resources based on the
18 The number of visas allocated to the country is not random, but applicants within a
particular country are pooled and selected at random.  See Ronen Perry & Tal Z. Zarsky,
“May the Odds be Ever in Your Favor”: Lotteries in Law, 66 ALA. L. REV. 1035, 1037 (2015)
(discussing the definition of randomization and random allocation techniques); see also
Kroll et al., supra note 2, at 674–75 (discussing the visa allocation process and its potential
shortcomings).
19 Another common discriminating factor is willingness to pay (WTP).  WTP is quite
difficult to game because game theory experts have developed sophisticated models which
strive to “force” participants to reveal their true preferences mechanism—mechanisms that
are not easily exported to other contexts and case studies we discuss in this Article.  The
archetype example is the auction.  For that reason, we are setting aside the rich literature
on the problems and solutions for measuring WTP. See Steven J. Brams & Joshua R. Mitts,
Law and Mechanism Design: Procedures to Induce Honest Bargaining, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 729, 757–58 (2013) (requiring one party to disclose their reservation price, i.e. willing-
ness to pay, is an ideal mechanism for coercing both parties to negotiate a transaction fairly
and honestly); Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Tetlock, Using Information Markets to Improve
Public Decision Making, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 213, 227–28 (2005) (discussing how to
achieve optimal public policy outcomes when discriminating between government contrac-
tors competing for an auctioned contract).
20 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1557, 42 U.S.C. § 18116 (2012).
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expected costs or value of the individuals.  The goal for discrimination
schemes is to allocate a resource based on an abstract and fundamentally
unknowable quality of the subjects relating to their skill, risk, need, merit, or
some other quality that is deemed appropriate to the relevant setting.  We
will call this quality the key characteristic.  For college admissions officers, the
key characteristic might be a mix of raw intelligence and future career suc-
cess.  For creditors, the key characteristic is the subject’s ability to pay in the
future.  It is easy to see why predictions of the future are fundamentally
unknowable, but even the most concrete and objective key characteristics
must be estimated.  For instance, consider the notion of impairment—an ele-
ment in various crimes (such as DUI).21  The abstract notion of impairment
is proved through seemingly concrete measures of intoxication,22 which usu-
ally approximate the proportion of alcohol in the subject’s breath or blood
while using the most sensitive and accurate equipment available.  This is a
very close substitute for impairment, but not perfect.23
So, to estimate the key characteristic, a decisionmaker must use an
algorithm—a set of rules—applied to proxies that the decisionmaker believes
have correlated with the key characteristic in the past and will hopefully con-
tinue to predict the key characteristic going forward.
Two important caveats about discrimination algorithms before we define
gaming: First, the only alternative to discrimination algorithms is pooling.24
It is tempting to distinguish machine algorithms from human assessment and
discretion, but the distinction is false.  Humans who attempt to discriminate
between subjects will also use a set of rules—sometimes instinct based and
inaccessible even to themselves—that estimates the subject’s key characteris-
tic based on proxies.  And this is just as true for so-called holistic
assessment.25
However, humans are likely to be less rigid than machine-run algo-
rithms, for good and for ill.26  For one thing, humans will be more varied
21 John McCurley, What’s the Difference Between Per Se and Impairment DUIs?, LAW-
YERS.COM, https://www.lawyers.com/legal-info/criminal/dui-dwi/what-s-the-difference-be
tween-per-se-and-impairment-duis.html (last visited Sept. 20, 2018) (describing the types of
evidence prosecutors must use to prove impairment).
22 This is sometimes referred to as per se impairment. Per Se DUI Laws, FINDLAW,
http://dui.findlaw.com/dui-laws-resources/per-se-dui-laws.html (last visited Sept. 20,
2018).
23 Even determining the winner of a footrace requires reliance on radio-frequency
identification or laser technologies that can have error and be tricked. See AHMED KHAT-
TAB ET. AL., RFID SECURITY 29 (2017).
24 Some discrimination algorithms can incorporate pooling, in the form of random-
ness, into its estimates.  This can be done for strategic reasons, as to avoid overfitting the
model to old training data or to deter and reduce the effect of gaming, as discussed below.
We still categorize these as discrimination algorithms as long as the overarching objective is
to allocate resources based on a key characteristic.
25 See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 86–87 (2003).
26 See Andrew McAfee, When Human Judgment Works Well, and When It Doesn’t, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Jan. 6, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/01/when-human-judgment-works-well-and-
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and inconsistent about the model that they apply to estimate the key charac-
teristic such that a subject’s assessment will depend on which human assessed
him, and when.27  In addition to using different models, humans may also
pursue different goals and choose to estimate different key characteristics.
That is, human variability can be caused by differing ideas of what “success”
or “failure” means.  Machine algorithms will use a consistent outcome mea-
sure to build its estimation model.  For example, banks often use default or
late payment within a fixed period of time to represent credit risk,28 and
police or courts use the presence of contraband following a search to
represent suspicion.  The outcome measure can be a complex composite of
multiple factors, but when machines are building a model, the objective is
defined in advance.  Also, at any given point in the learning process,
machines will apply the same model uniformly to all subjects.  Humans, by
contrast, may use different conceptions of a successful outcome from one
another, and these choices will affect the estimation model that each will use
for their subjects.  In fact, each individual human decisionmaker may even
use inconsistent models and inconsistent conceptions of success, at different
times, or for different subjects.29  This makes human decisionmaking noisier.
But the nature of the algorithmic process is not different; humans apply
structured rules based on proxies, too.
Our analysis focuses on automated algorithmic decision-making
processes.  Because they are more rigid and consistent, machine decision-
making has qualities that are more amenable to systematic gaming.30  Moreo-
ver, gaming in the context of automated algorithms has more salience
because of the growing reliance on digital intermediaries in many social con-
texts.  Strategic behavior has been studied and accounted for in some systems
where the rules are made and applied by humans, but the insights have not
been extended to the distinct features of machine decisionmakers.
The second important caveat about discrimination algorithms is that dis-
crimination, as we use the term, is intended to be value neutral.  Discrimina-
tion has come to have a negative connotation because the term is closely
associated with unethical or illegal use of race, sex, religion, or other
when-it-doesnt; see also DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011) (distinguish-
ing human and machine learning processes in decisionmaking).
27 Machine learning algorithms have ever-changing models, too, by using techniques
such as neural networking to improve the prediction rules as more data becomes available.
The difference, though, is that humans may use different models or change their own
internal models without regard for any new information that may become available.
28 COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ADM’R OF NAT’L BANKS, U.S. DEP’T. OF TREASURY,
RATING CREDIT RISK: COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK 4 (2001), https://www.occ.treas.gov/pub-
lications/publications-by-type/comptrollers-handbook/rating-credit-risk/pub-ch-rating-
credit-risk.pdf.
29 McAfee, supra note 26.
30 For a similar argument, see Bamberger, supra note 12, at 714 (noting that “[t]he
predictability of rule-bound code and the often static nature of technological implementa-
tions” can allow for tricking the systems and hiding indications of risk, while the technolog-
ical “[l]ayers” hide these gaming attempts from human oversight).
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demographics of protected, historically vulnerable groups.  For this reason,
some scholars have preferred to use the term “separation” rather than “dis-
crimination.”31  We will continue to use the term “discrimination,” but we do
not intend to invoke the legally prohibited practice.  To the contrary,
throughout this Article, we assume that algorithms designed to discriminate
between subjects are estimating a key characteristic and using proxies that
are both legal and ethical to use for decisionmaking.  If at any point this
assumption seems to be unwarranted, then it means there is a moral or legal
issue outside the bounds of our project.  In other words, we address practices
that do not raise antidiscrimination concerns involving ex ante illegal dis-
criminatory intent, or ex post effects that can present viable disparate impact
claims for protected groups.32
We are putting aside the topic of prohibited discrimination because it is
too great a distraction from the Article’s main concern—critical issues that
emerge even when decisionmakers are using legal and presumptively ethical
sorting mechanisms.  Moreover, a fine literature has already developed
around the topic of algorithms and prohibited discrimination of protected
classes.  For example, Solon Barocas and Andrew Selbst have written clearly
and powerfully about the potential for automated algorithms to cause dispa-
rate impacts on discrete and insular minority groups in ways that challenge
traditional Title VII law.33  To the extent an algorithm uses proxies that are
so closely correlated with race or sex that they have almost no over- or under-
inclusion, there’s little reason to doubt the impropriety (and illegality) of the
algorithm’s use of race.34  This could occur, for example, if machine learning
begins to use complexion from photographs as a variable in its model.  But
when an algorithm uses proxies that merely correlate with race while serving
the legitimate purpose of the prediction algorithm, the ethical questions are
both hard and outside the scope of our particular project.35  The propriety
31 James C. Cooper, Separation Anxiety, 21 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3 (2017).
32 See Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, The Philosophy of Discrimination: An Introduction, in
THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE ETHICS OF DISCRIMINATION 1, 2 (Kasper Lippert-Ras-
mussen ed., 2017), for an explanation as to these elements of antidiscrimination law and
policy.
33 Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 701–12.
34 For a similar argument, see Tal Z. Zarsky, Understanding Discrimination in the Scored
Society, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1375, 1394–96 (2014).  Zarsky explains that the use of “blatant
proxies” should be considered as discriminatory conduct. Id. Such discriminatory find-
ings could be derived from either ex ante or ex post antidiscrimination arguments.
35 Kroll et al., supra note 2, at 681 (“Eliminating proxies [for race] can be difficult,
because proxy variables often contain other useful information that an analyst wishes the
model to consider (for example, zip codes may indicate both race and differentials in local
policy that is of legitimate interest to a lender).”).  To get a sense of how difficult this
question is, consider, for example, test scores from a validated instrument like an SAT
exam.  These may have some rough correlation with race and sex, but it is not at all clear
that using the test score would be improper.  In fact, Supreme Court precedence suggests
that removing a test score proxy in order to equalize outcomes can violate antidiscrimina-
tion law, too. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 563 (2009) (holding that the City’s
action of discarding a standardized test violated Title VII).  Opinions vary about whether
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of discriminating between subjects is therefore fraught.  There may be rea-
sons, both moral and practical, to force decisionmakers either to pool or not
pool subjects.  But for this project, we do not engage in antidiscrimination
policy and generally do not question the goal of differentiating between sub-
jects and treating them differently.
At last, that brings us to gaming.  Because discrimination algorithms use
proxies to estimate a key characteristic that does not and cannot measure the
real thing, there is a gap between the inputs of an algorithm and the true
value of the key characteristic.36  That gap can be intentionally exploited,
and when it is, the algorithm is being gamed.  Gaming is a purposeful change
in order to alter the algorithm’s estimates.
To be clear, gaming involves a change in the subject’s behavior in order
to affect the algorithm’s estimate without causing any change to the key character-
istic that the algorithm is attempting to measure.  So, if an algorithm attempts
to estimate a subject’s health based on food purchases and Fitbit data, and
the subject consequently begins to exercise regularly and eat a nutritious
diet, those behavioral changes will affect both the algorithm’s estimate and
the subject’s actual health.  In this case, the algorithm induced a change not
only to the subject’s behavior but also to the subject’s key characteristic
(health) and thus the actions do not amount to gaming under our definition.
On the other hand, if the subject purchases carrots without eating them and
puts his Fitbit on his dog while he watches television, then the subject is
engaged in gaming because he is altering his conduct in ways that will not
change his overall health.37
As with the term “discrimination,” we use the term “gaming” neutrally.
The term has acquired negative connotations in some contexts, suggesting
something akin to cheating.38  But we use the term “game” with the same
the test used in that particular case was a good proxy for the key characteristic of leader-
ship and competence for which it was used, but the case can be understood to stand for the
idea that pooling subjects for the explicit purpose of achieving racially balanced outcomes
can be as violative of antidiscrimination laws as discriminating based on race. Id. at 565,
583.
36 Pretending here, for the sake of simplicity, that a true and objective version of the
world exists.
37 Or, if these behaviors do marginally improve his health, the improvements to actual
health will be trivial as compared to the improvement in the algorithm’s estimate of his
health.  Note that at times the factor actually sought is the individual’s ability to achieve a
specific objective, regardless of the means which might include gaming.  In that instance,
the ability to game will serve as a proper proxy on its own.  For instance, in a famous Star
Trek incident, James Kirk (still as a cadet at Starfleet Academy) was faced with a simulated
test in which he could not win.  Kirk nonetheless prevailed after reprogramming the simu-
lator to enable a solution.  Rather than being punished, Kirk was commended for his origi-
nal thinking. See Kobayashi Maru, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kobayashi_Ma
ru#James_T._Kirk.27s_test (last visited Oct. 29, 2017) (discussing Kirk’s attempts to face
the “Kobayashi Maru” exercise in Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan).
38 Wikipedia, for instance, groups “gaming the system” with “abusing the system” and
“cheating the system.” See Gaming the System, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Gaming_the_system (last visited Oct. 29, 2017).
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detachment that the subfield of game theory has.  It can include notions of
cheating, rule bending and even breaking, as well as mere strategic behavior.
In fact, as will be evident from the examples we provide below, people who
engage in gaming can represent the full range of ethical motives, from para-
sitic, to benign, to downright noble.39
Finally, gaming refers only to intentional actions carried out by an
algorithm’s subject, as opposed to distortions that resulted from accidental
actions or confusion.  At the same time, we will apply a broad meaning of
“intent.”  The gamer need not have immoral or malicious purposes.  A know-
ing attempt to change the way the proxy is being measured will suffice.40
B. Who Got Game?
Given the value-neutral definition of gaming that we provide above, it
should be clear that everybody engages in gaming.  High schoolers take SAT
prep courses not because those crash courses have a hope of meaningfully
changing their preparedness for college, but because the SAT test can be
gamed.41  Prospective home buyers begin to use and dutifully pay off their
credit cards not because the exercise actually makes them more responsible
as debtors, but because creditors will use this history to assess creditworthi-
ness.  Drivers avoid major thoroughfares on New Year’s Eve even if the drive
takes longer not because avoiding the major streets makes them less likely to
drink and drive, but because, whether they are drunk or not, they wish to
avoid police checkpoints.  We alter our behavior to game algorithms all the
time either because we do not accept the accuracy or fairness of the model or
because we simply want favorable treatment.
However, not everybody games the same way.  Gaming requires informa-
tion, time, effort, and resources, so some will be in a better position to game
than others.  This means that gaming has important distributional effects.
Generally speaking, the wealthier and better-educated members of the popu-
lation will be in a better position to game because they have more resources
to learn, discover, and navigate complex rules.  Occasionally lower socioeco-
39 The notion of a “game[ ]” is difficult to define and changes from context to con-
text.  It was even used by Ludwig Wittgenstein to demonstrate the notion of “family resem-
blance[ ]” of concepts that are difficult to define overall. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN,
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 32 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 2d ed. 1958).  See also,
among others, discussion in Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and
Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (2001).
40 This definition would also include instances in which the individual attempts to
game the algorithm in a specific way and fails, but while doing so manages to successfully
manipulate the outcome in a different way.  Also, at times, individuals might be coerced to
“game” by an employer or some other actor with a power advantage.  Gaming under duress
raises difficult issues that we do not address here.  We also do not address gaming in the
context of sports, though we suspect at least some of the value trade-offs are relevant to
sporting competitions as well.
41 See Dylan Hernandez, How I Learned to Take the SAT Like a Rich Kid, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/opinion/how-i-learned-to-take-the-sat-
like-a-rich-kid.html.
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nomic status subjects, however, will have an advantage because they may have
more time or motivation to exploit proxies.  It is fair to assume that gaming
by lower-status members of society is more likely to be characterized as cheat-
ing while similar strategic behavior by high-status groups will not be charac-
terized in such a derogative way, and may even be perceived as shrewd or
cunning.
Gaming also sometimes requires a lack of moral reservation.  For exam-
ple, some gaming strategies depend on faking the inputs of an algorithm—a
polite way of saying that it requires lying.  Even if these fraudulent inputs are
perfectly legal and cause minimal or no externalities to others, some people
will not game.  They are constitutionally opposed to deceit.  Even apart from
outright lies, some gaming techniques will trigger qualms for some on the
bases of moral or religious convictions without raising concerns for others.
These personal differences will have important effects on the values we
discuss in Part II.  So as we discuss the gaming and countergaming strategies,
it is worth keeping in the back of your minds the ways in which the tech-
niques will effectively split the population into groups of people and entities
who are willing and able to game and those who are not.
C. Where’s the Game in Life?
Gaming strategies can be classified into four basic types.
Avoidance is a process by which a person avoids being the subject of an
algorithm’s model at all.42  For example, smugglers that avoid routes that are
known to have checkpoints and regular law enforcement surveillance aim to
avoid criminal investigation and arrest through avoidance.
Altered conduct involves changing behavior with the hope that the new
behavior will change the proxies (inputs) that a model is using and record-
ing, thus resulting in a changed estimate.  Purchasing carrots without eating
them in order to improve health estimates is an example.
Altered input is similar to altered conduct in that the goal is to change
an input that the model will use to bias the estimate.  However, altered inputs
involve manipulating or falsely reporting an input rather than changing con-
duct in order to manipulate a correctly reported input.  The altered input
strategy is available for algorithms that feature self-reporting of some form.43
Falsely reporting income on a tax return is a form of altered input.  The
42 Returning to Marx’s taxonomy, he discusses avoidance moves (which we use here,
more or less with the same meaning), switching moves (which are similar to altered con-
duct), distortion moves, and masking moves, which are similar but not perfect matches for
altered inputs and obfuscation. See Gary T. Marx, supra note 15; see also BRUCE SCHNEIER,
DATA AND GOLIATH: THE HIDDEN BATTLES TO COLLECT YOUR DATA AND CONTROL YOUR
WORLD 251 (2016) (recommending that individuals who wish to avoid data surveillance
alter their behavior to avoid detection, e.g., by paying in cash rather than using a credit
card, or by deliberately keeping transactions under a reporting threshold).
43 However, altered inputs are not necessarily limited to forms and documents.  Wear-
ing camouflage could be considered a form of altered input, although there is also a case
that it could be categorized as altered conduct. See The History of Razzle Dazzle Camouflage,
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software in some Volkswagen models was designed to falsely report emissions
during motor vehicle inspections.44
The line between altered input and altered conduct is not bright, and
reasonable minds could differ on how a particular strategy should be catego-
rized.45  For example, placing a Fitbit on a dog as a way to gain points in a
wellness program may be considered an altered input (because the model
assumes the Fitbit measures the subject’s activity) but it could be considered
altered conduct (because the model is agnostic about where the Fitbit is as
long as the heart rate and steps actually occurred and were measured).  Like-
wise, it is difficult to categorize the conduct of parties who change a
Wikipedia entry in anticipation of litigation in order to influence the defini-
tion that a court will use for a term of art critical to the case.46
Obfuscation tactics are gaming tactics that are akin to a form of resis-
tance.  Finn Brunton and Helen Nissenbaum define obfuscation as “the
deliberate addition of ambiguous, confusing, or misleading information to
interfere with surveillance and data collection”47 and categorize using these
tactics as a “weapon for the informationally weak.”48  Often, these measures
require cooperation among many individuals.49  Our examples below will
clarify this term further.
Obfuscators typically protest the algorithm by confusing or overwhelm-
ing it, leading to inaccurate results for both the subject and for others.  For
example, when more than a million Facebook users checked in at Standing
Rock at a time when police were rumored to use Facebook to identify protes-
tors, the obfuscators made the signal (checking in at Standing Rock) so
error-prone that the actual protestors who had checked in were protected,
TWISTED SIFTER (Feb. 4, 2010), http://twistedsifter.com/2010/02/razzle-dazzle-camou
flage/.
44 See Mulligan & Bamberger, supra note 7, at 718 (noting the Volkswagen scheme as
an example of gaming a technological compliance mechanism); Guilbert Gates et al., How
Volkswagen’s ‘Defeat Devices’ Worked, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2015/business/international/vw-diesel-emissions-scandal-explained.html (last updated
Mar. 16, 2017).
45 Calo et al. address a central hacking method as “fooling a trained classifier or detec-
tor into mischaracterizing an input in the inference phase.”  Calo et al., supra note 14, at
6–7.  This definition as well as some of the examples used to describe it could fit for both
altered conduct and inputs. See id.
46 See D Magazine Partners, L.P. v. Rosenthal, 529 S.W.3d 429, 436 (Tex. 2017) (quot-
ing Noam Cohen, Courts Turn to Wikipedia, but Selectively, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2007), http://
www.nytimes.com/2007/01/29/technology/29wikipedia.html (describing “opportunistic
editing” by litigants)).  Bruce Schneier provides another example of altered conduct which
might also be considered as altered input: putting rocks in one’s shoes “to fool gait recog-
nition systems.” SCHNEIER, supra note 42, at 255 (describing CORY DOCTOROW, LITTLE
BROTHER (2008)).
47 BRUNTON & NISSENBAUM, supra note 10, at 1; see also Marx, supra note 15.
48 BRUNTON & NISSENBAUM, supra note 10, at 62.
49 See, e.g., id. at 21.
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too.50  At times, obfuscation strategies take steps to enhance conformity and
create artificial homogeneous outcomes throughout the pool.  One well-
known (if apocryphal) example is the commitment by the King of Denmark
and other Danish citizens to wear yellow stars of David so that their Jewish
neighbors could not be identified.51  This tactic is also referred to as the “I
Am Spartacus” method (as featured in the famous motion picture,
Spartacus).52
In response to gaming (or in anticipation of it53), algorithm designers
can use one or more countertactics.54  Most involve changing the estimation
model.  Algorithm designers can increase the complexity of the model by
adding more predictive proxy variables or by introducing more randomness
so that the incentives and ability to game the algorithm are reduced.55  They
can also design the algorithm to frequently change the model so that either
the proxies or the weighting used to apply to each proxy will change over
time and be less known or predictable for subjects, and thus more difficult to
game.  With machine learning algorithms, frequent changes are inherent to
the continuously improving, ever-changing system.  Algorithm designers can
50 Merrit Kennedy, More Than 1 Million ‘Check In’ on Facebook to Support the Standing Rock
Sioux, NPR (Nov. 1, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/11/01/500268
879/more-than-a-million-check-in-on-facebook-to-support-the-standing-rock-sioux; Sam
Levin & Nicky Woolf, A Million People ‘Check In’ at Standing Rock on Facebook to Support Dakota
Pipeline Protesters, GUARDIAN (Oct. 31, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/
oct/31/north-dakota-access-pipeline-protest-mass-facebook-check-in.  A similar phenome-
non occurred when a bank robber used social media to gather many people wearing a
similar uniform to the location from which he fled the scene.  Caroline McCarthy, Bank
Robber Hires Decoys on Craigslist, Fools Cops, CNET (Oct. 3, 2008), https://www.cnet.com/
news/bank-robber-hires-decoys-on-craigslist-fools-cops.
51 David Mikkelson, The King of Denmark Wore a Yellow Star, SNOPES, http://www.snopes
.com/history/govern/yellowstars.asp (last updated Nov. 18, 2016); see also BRUNTON & NIS-
SENBAUM, supra note 10, at 17.
52 See Zbigniew Kwecka et al., “I Am Spartacus”: Privacy Enhancing Technologies, Collabora-
tive Obfuscation and Privacy as a Public Good, 22 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 113, 115
(2014); SPARTACUS (Bryna Productions 1960).
53 Responses to gaming are also an integral part of the field of Algorithmic Mecha-
nism Design. See supra notes 9 &19 and accompanying text.
54 In his later work, Gary Marx moved on to address countermoves as well. See Gary T.
Marx, Opinion, A Tack in the Shoe and Taking Off the Shoe: Neutralization and Counter-Neutrali-
zation Dynamics, 6 SURVEILLANCE & SOC’Y 294 (2009).  The taxonomy he sets forth includes
some of the elements discussed in the text.  He states four central countermoves: (1)
“[t]echnological enhancement”—which resembles the option of collecting additional
information, (2) “[c]reation of uncertainty”—which resembles the option noted to change
the process often and reducing transparency, (3) using “[m]ultiple means”—which resem-
bles our point regarding collecting additional information, and (4) “[n]ew rules and pen-
alties”—a notion we will address later in the text as we explain the possible role law can
play in this context. Id. at 300.
55 One technique that is often used to avoid overfitting the model to past data but that
also has some advantages for avoiding gaming is the addition of random noise. See Kroll et
al., supra note 2, at 653–55; Richard M. Zur et al., Noise Injection for Training Artificial Neural
Networks: A Comparison with Weight Decay and Early Stopping, 36 MED. PHYSICS 4810 (2009).
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also alter the model to rely on more immutable proxies that subjects have less
ability to change.  These proxies are not limited to the demographic charac-
teristics that dominate equal protection analysis.56  To the contrary, educa-
tion, employment, and zip codes are difficult to change, too.57  And whether
they change the model or not, algorithm designers can reduce the trans-
parency of their model so that gamers do not have as much information.58
Reducing transparency sometimes requires efforts to make it more difficult
for interested parties to test (or “ping”) the system to learn its inner work-
ings.59  Furthermore, those striving to discriminate can do so by gathering
more, or differently sourced, data about the same set of proxies.  Some of
these sources may be more reliable.  Even if the sources of information are
no more reliable, the algorithm designer can gain accuracy by increasing the
number of sources or re-collecting and reassessing the data from their origi-
nal sources so that gaming is costlier and more difficult to maintain.60
Some of these countertactics leverage the characteristics of big data—
they use volume, velocity, and variety to improve veracity.61  Also, many of
these counterstrategies—increased complexity, frequent changes to the
model, reduced transparency, and increased data gathering—are innate fea-
tures of machine learning algorithms anyway.62  Since machine learning is
poised to dominate the automated scoring and decision-making domain,
these countertactics are likely to become methods of first resort.
The countergaming strategies we describe here are just the self-help
mechanisms available to algorithm designers.  There can also be forms of
political and legal recourse, too.  Specific rules and prohibitions, enforced
through contract or through public law, can be set in place to reduce gam-
56 See, e.g., Robert Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman, Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart
City, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 162 (2018) (noting a possible response to gaming through
the use of “objective” factors which cannot be gamed).
57 See Sharona Hoffman, The Importance of Immutability in Employment Discrimination
Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1483 (2011) (discussing substantial normative problems in the
use of immutable factors for discrimination). But see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 396
(1986) (addressing and rejecting the notion that immutable characteristics should categor-
ically be forbidden from use).
58 See Mulligan & Bamberger, supra note 7, at 719 (noting that to prevent gamesman-
ship transparency is even actively opposed when implanting automated governance
systems).
59 This form of attack is at times referred to as the “Carnival Booth” algorithm. See
Samidh Chakrabarti & Aaron Strauss, Carnival Booth: An Algorithm for Defeating the Computer-
Assisted Passenger Screening System, FIRST MONDAY, OCT. 2002, http://firstmonday.org/ojs/
index.php/fm/article/view/992/913.
60 Note that we distinguish countergaming strategies from instances where companies
and other entities with large amounts of data exploit the information in order to game
their investors or consumers in some way—e.g. to improve their consumer ratings or cre-
ate “sucker lists.”  These are first-order gaming strategies, not countergaming corrections.
61 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH.,
BIG DATA AND PRIVACY: A TECHNOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 2 (2014); Daniel L. Rubinfeld &
Michal S. Gal, Access Barriers to Big Data, 59 ARIZ. L. REV. 339, 346 (2017).
62 Kroll et al., supra note 2.
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ing.  We describe the role of law in Part II.  But before we consider the role of
law, we will present four examples that illustrate the dynamic between gam-
ing and countergaming moves.  Not all these examples are state-of-the-art or
particularly complex, but by understanding them, we can extrapolate and
anticipate what can happen when more sophisticated automated scoring
methods are set in place.  They provide a good entry point to the algorithm
game.
Example 1:  Policing and Probable Cause
Law enforcement agencies are authorized to stop cars on the roadways
based on reasonable suspicion of criminal behavior.63  The car may be
searched without a warrant based on probable cause.64  In time, these deci-
sions may be made more efficiently and accurately with the help of machines,
but in the “small data” world,65 these discrimination decisions are made by
officers with the help of internal guidance documents.  In either case, there
is an algorithm in place, and the game is on.
One set of law enforcement guidelines, from the “Operation Pipeline”
project designed to detect drug couriering on major interstate highways,
instructed officers to look for telltale signs that the driver of a car may be on
a drug run.  Keychains containing only one key suggested that the car was
either rented or borrowed, a common practice for drug couriers.  The bor-
rowed car in combination with the fact that the car has no passengers, is
being used between major cities, and has one or more bags from fast food
restaurants would further strengthen the suspicion that the driver is not a
typical business traveler and has been driving nonstop on a mission—all con-
sistent with drug running.  An air freshener (particularly in a rental car)
would also signal that the driver may be nervous about the smells of
contraband.66
Once these rules are learned or inferred by drug rings, however, they
can be exploited using the gaming strategies described above.67  An obvious
and common tactic is avoidance by bypassing the interstate highways in places
where police are frequently stationed.  This type of information wouldn’t be
well known to innocent travelers, but major illicit drug operators will ironi-
cally have more information than the innocent about where their drivers
have historically encountered problems.
63 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
64 See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 347 (2009) (citing United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798, 820–21 (1982)); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 50–51 (1970); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
65 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L.
REV. 327, 329 (2015).
66 Bambauer, supra note 5, at 505.
67 See, e.g., Larry Celona & Sophia Rosenbaum, Officials Bust Drug Ring Making Deliveries
in Luxury Cars, N.Y. POST (July 12, 2014), http://nypost.com/2014/07/12 /officials-bust-
drug-ring-making-deliveries-in-luxury-cars/ (discussing how a drug ring used luxury vehi-
cles outfitted with “trap” compartments to transport and deliver drugs).
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The drug rings can also engage in altered behavior. Drivers can be
instructed to make sure that they keep their cars clean and free of McDon-
ald’s wrappers, that they keep multiple keys on the car key’s ring, and that
they avoid using any visible air fresheners.  Brazen drug rings might consider
applying obfuscation models.  They might clutter the police by sending out
drivers with empty cars with a single key and plenty of trash in the back seat
to cruise through the surveilled route.  Or they could pay a local gas station
to distribute free air fresheners to drivers passing through.
The police have some countergaming strategies available to them.  To
counter the avoidance strategies, they can set up patrols on bottlenecks like
bridges or in areas where avoidance would be very costly (in terms of travel
time) for the couriers.  This increases their reliance on factors that cannot be
avoided by drug couriers (that is, on immutable factors).  The police can use
other immutable factors, too.  For example, a necessary fact about large
quantities of some types of drugs is that they emit an odor.  Increasing the
use of drug-sniffing canines at traffic stops or traffic jams can make use of this
unavoidable characteristic of drugs.  Law enforcement also can (and does)
increase the complexity of their suspicion models by changing the set of rules
used to establish probable cause.
However, one option that is not realistically available to police is reduced
transparency because every arrest, and most stops and searches, too, require
the police to document and explain their basis for suspicion.  The Fourth
Amendment and Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution strictly limit
the reduced transparency strategy for countering gaming by vesting every
criminal suspect with a right of explanation.  The Fourth Amendment also
blocks the use of random, suspicionless stops by the police in an effort to
confuse criminals about the factors they are using to build suspicion.68
Example 2:  Employability Scoring
Employers face substantial challenges identifying talented and dependa-
ble employees.  To improve recruitment success and lower costs, firms
increasingly turn to algorithmic recommendations.69  For instance, today
many employers use automated applicant surveys,70 online games and com-
petitions,71 and analysis of social networks72 (which use the candidates’ and
68 See Bernard E. Harcourt & Tracey L. Meares, Randomization and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 809 (2011).
69 See generally Matthew T. Bodie et al., The Law and Policy of People Analytics, 88 U.
COLO. L. REV. 961 (2017).
70 Google began doing so over a decade ago. See Saul Hansell, Google Answer to Filling
Jobs Is an Algorithm, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/03/tech
nology/03google.html.
71 Bodie et al., supra note 69, at 976–80 (discussing the people analytics game
“Knack”).
72 Some firms promise to assist in recruiting by analyzing candidates’ social networks.
For instance, see Vladlena Benson et al., Social Career Management: Social Media and
Employability Skills Gap, 30 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 519, 519 (2014) (suggesting social
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others’ social network profiles).73
This style of recruitment could cause tectonic changes in the labor mar-
ket.  Rather than attending the most elite possible colleges, prospective
employees could train for the specific exams used by their favored employers.
And prospective employees may also change their online habits when they
are cautioned, as they frequently are (most notably by President Obama) to
remain vigilant about online postings that can be accessed by potential
employers.74
These responses—training for the test and carefully crafting an online
persona—can constitute gaming.  To the extent employees invest their time
in beating tests and games without actually developing greater relevant work-
related skills, the change in behavior is altered conduct. Prospective employees
also might engage in avoidance of the social networks employers typically
access, opting to conduct more authentic forms of communications in other,
less accessible networks such as Snapchat or Telegram.  Or, they might alter
their conduct by creating at least two online identities: one public for
employers to see, and another private (perhaps using a pseudonym) where
less restrained communications with closer friends are conducted.  Alterna-
tively, even if an employee maintains just one profile, he might alter the inputs
used by employers by refraining from uploading photos and information that
reflect the less desirable aspects of his life (from an employer’s perspec-
tive).75  A shrewd job candidate can even engage in obfuscation by uploading
media usage may predict leadership qualities); Charles Coy, How Big Data Is Changing the
Recruiting Game, CORNERSTONE (Feb. 10, 2015), https://www.cornerstoneondemand.com/
rework/how-big-data-changing-recruiting-game.  China’s launch of the “sesame” score will
use social media data to score everything from employability to nationalist loyalty.  Rachel
Botsman, Big Data Meets Big Brother as China Moves to Rate Its Citizens, WIRED (Oct. 21, 2017),
https://www.wired.co.uk /article/chinese-government-social-credit-score-privacyinvasion.
73 Some recruiters even examine applicants’ spelling on social networks. See Dan
Schawbel, How Recruiters Use Social Networks to Make Hiring Decisions Now, TIME (July 9,
2012), http://business.time.com/2012/07/09/how-recruiters-use-social-networks-to-make-
hiring-decisions-now/; see also Saige Driver, Keep It Clean: Social Media Screenings Gain in
Popularity, BUS. NEWS DAILY (Oct. 7, 2018), http://www.businessnewsdaily.com/2377-social-
media-hiring.html.
74 Harriet Alexander, Barack Obama Tells Chicago Students “Failure Is Terrible but Some-
times Necessary” in First Speech Since Stepping Down as President, TELEGRAPH (Apr. 24, 2017),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/04/24/barack-obama-returns-fray-chicago-first-
speech-since-stepping.
75 This type of change in behavior—a cautious reticence—is also known as “chilling
effects” from surveillance. See, e.g., Jonathon W. Penney, Whose Speech Is Chilled by Surveil-
lance?, SLATE (July 27, 2017), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/
2017/07/women_young_people_experience_the_chilling_effects_of_surveillance_at_high
er.html.  Like other chilling effects, the change in behavior may involve both gaming and
nongaming components.  To the extent that this sort of restraint correlates with the sort of
good judgment and caution an employer is looking for, the change in behavior is not
gaming; instead, it signals a real distinction in the key characteristic—being a reliable
employee with good judgment.  On the other hand, to the extent restraint in postings does
not indicate a difference in good judgment but instead merely hides information about the
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a lot of seemingly milquetoast photographs that can signal a different, more
deviant message to their peers, essentially camouflaging photographs of their
drinking.
Employers, of course, have several countermoves available to them.
They can constantly change the games and surveys that applicants have to
take in order to undermine rote preparation.  They might also reduce trans-
parency by keeping the process as secretive as possible.  Finally, they might
diversify their sources of personal data to undermine attempts by prospective
employees to scrub their online presence.
Example 3:  Financial Tech Firms and Alternative Credit Scoring
The financial technology sector (“fintech”) is a relatively new industry of
startup companies.  What makes them “tech” is the advanced predictive ana-
lytics they use to create novel credit models and financial products.  These
companies, as well as insurance firms, are seeking new ways to assess risk of
credit defaults and medical payments.  To improve on old models, they often
use data from unconventional sources like electronic devices (smartphone
apps or wearables like Fitbits) that transmit the user’s geolocation.76  Loca-
tion-based data allow firms to learn about the places their customers do and
do not go.  They reveal demographics, habits, and social networks.
Wearables also record biometric information, like heart rate and the number
of steps taken, which allows the collecting entity to make predictions about
the individual’s current and future health—important factors when consider-
ing both health and credit risks.77
Many fintech and insurance customers will agree to this more intrusive
data collection in order to get some benefit (usually better terms or lower
premium payments).  But they also might take steps to game the metrics that
use the information on geolocation or physical activity.  They might alter their
conduct by switching their devices off (or leaving them at home) when visiting
high-risk locations like casinos or discount and liquor stores.  Conversely,
they can have a collaborator take their device to areas that correlate with low
risk like gyms or evening education centers.  They might alter the inputs by
affixing their Fitbit (or other wearable) to their hyper dogs to get credit for
prospective employee’s antisocial behavior, then it is gaming since it will change an
employer’s assessment without actually marking a distinction in the key characteristic.
76 For instance, note the actions of Vitality, a UK insurer. Activity Tracking, VITALITY,
https://www.vitality.co.uk/rewards/partners/activity-tracking/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2018).
77 Denise Johnson, How Wearable Devices Could Disrupt the Insurance Industry, INS. J. (May
6, 2015), https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2015/05/06/367014.htm
(discussing the increasing adoption of wearable technologies by the insurance industry);
see also Samuel Gibbs, Court Sets Legal Precedent with Evidence from Fitbit Health Tracker, GUARD-
IAN (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/nov/18/court-ac
cepts-data-fitbit-health-tracker (explaining Canadian plaintiff in personal injury suit was
permitted to use information from Fitbit wearable device as an objective measure to show
life-affecting reduced activity postinjury).
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steps while sitting around watching TV.78  With organized coordination, they
could even engage in obfuscation by recruiting other users to falsely check in
at a “negative” location to undermine the accuracy and reputation of the
decisionmaker’s model.79
Firms have already responded to some of these gaming practices, and
will no doubt continue to develop more efficient responses.  Creditworthi-
ness models are notoriously nontransparent, closely guarded as trade secrets
to keep them not only from copycat competitors, but also to avoid strategic
behavior by credit applicants.80  These companies also invest in technological
measures to detect gaming; they collect and analyze copious data so that the
models can properly distinguish between, e.g., human and dog (or other
mechanical) movements on a pedometer.  Indeed, in order to correct for
Fitbit “cheaters” who put the device on a pet or machine, the wearables
industry improved the sensitivity of its pedometers—an outcome that not
only countered the gaming, but also made the devices more resistant to unin-
tentional overcounting.81  Employers may also use new data sources that are
harder to fool, such as apps or tracking devices that require biometric
identification.82
78 Rachel Bachman, Want to Cheat Your Fitbit? Try a Puppy or a Power Drill, WALL ST. J.
(June 9, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/want-to-cheat-your-fitbit-try-using-a-puppy-
or-a-power-drill-1465487106.  For instance, in Episode 5, Season 9 of The Big Bang Theory,
engineer Howard Wolowitz constructs a gadget to trick the Fitbit into believing he is run-
ning. The Big Bang Theory: The Perspiration Implementation (CBS television broadcast Oct. 19,
2015).
79 This indeed unfolded in the context of specific protest locations.  Catherine E.
Shoichet, Why Your Facebook Friends Are Checking in at Standing Rock, CNN (Oct. 31, 2016),
http://edition.cnn.com/2016/10/31/us/standing-rock-facebook-check-ins/index.html.
For an even more elaborate attack scheme, see Calo et al., supra note 14, at 14.  Here, the
authors offer a strategy to “poison[ ] a crowd-sourced credit rating system.”  To do so, they
propose building a webpage in which individuals on skateboards are marked by peers as
ideal borrowers, and then uploading skateboarding photos by these hackers to their own
homepages as means to gain a comfortable loan. Id. Note that this example is somewhat
limited to the crowd-sourcing context.
80 Mikella Hurley & Julius Adebayo, Credit Scoring in the Era of Big Data, 18 YALE J.L. &
TECH. 148, 197 (2016) (discussing the issues surrounding the lack of transparency in the
current credit scoring system, as well as the effects increased transparency would have on
individual attempts to “game” the system).
81 Shelten Yuen, lead engineer for Fitbit, discusses the efforts to improve the pedome-
ter to avoid counting nonstep motions in a recorded public conversation.  Shelten Yuen,
Wearing Your Doctor on Your Wrist, U. OF ARIZ. DOWNTOWN LECTURE SERIES (Nov. 9, 2016),
https://sbsdowntown.arizona.edu/bodies-health; see also Sohrab Saeb et al., Making Activity
Recognition Robust Against Deceptive Behavior, 10 PLOS ONE 1 (2015), http://journals.plos
.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0144795; Marla Paul, You Can’t Fool This
Activity Tracker, NW. NOW (Jan. 11, 2016), https://news.northwestern.edu/stories/2016/
01/fool-activity-tracker.
82 Ge Peng et al., Continuous Authentication with Touch Behavioral Biometrics and Voice on
Wearable Glasses, 47 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON HUM.-MACHINE SYSTEMS 404, 404 (2017) (dis-
cussing new increased protection mechanisms, including biometric identification, to verify
the identity of the technology’s wearer).
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Example 4:  Corporate Reputation Management
Firms providing goods and services have had to adapt to a new business
terrain in which consumers have access to a lot more information.  In the
digital age, a company’s reputation is often influenced by third-party
intermediaries such as Yelp or Amazon.  These intermediaries use algorithms
to provide an overall quality score for each company (typically dominated by
the average customer review, but with some modifications).83  To gain an
advantage over competitors, firms often engage in gaming these
intermediaries’ scores.  In this case, the commercial firm games an algorithm
used by consumers rather than the other way around.
Firms use the same strategies that individuals do.  They might alter the
inputs by writing phony positive reviews about themselves (a practice referred
to as “astroturfing”)84 and negative reviews regarding their main competi-
tors.  They might also alter their conduct, specifically their contract-drafting
practices, by including language in their terms of service that forbids custom-
ers from writing negative reviews about their experiences.85  When things are
particularly dire, the firm can even change its name and try to shed its bag-
gage by starting with a fresh, new reputation.
But the intermediaries have caught on.  They have an incentive to main-
tain the integrity and accuracy of their scoring systems so that consumers
continue to rely on them and visit their websites.  The countermoves applied
by information intermediaries are the same, familiar tactics described above.
Intermediaries cloak their ranking models to reduce transparency and hin-
83 Leigh Held, Behind the Curtain of Yelp’s Powerful Reviews, ENTREPRENEUR (July 9,
2014), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/235271 (“Yelp has software that evaluates
every single review based on quality, reliability and user activity on Yelp . . . .”).  The article
then discusses how the algorithm evaluates each of these three factors in further detail. Id.
84 See Tal Z. Zarsky, Law and Online Social Networks: Mapping the Challenges and Promises
of User-Generated Information Flows, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 741, 778–79
(2008); see also Press Release, N.Y. State Attorney Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Announces
Agreement with 19 Companies to Stop Writing Fake Online Reviews and Pay More than
$350,000 in Fines (Sept. 23, 2013), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-
announces-agreement-19-companies-stop-writing-fake-online-reviews-and.  This issue is cur-
rently mostly being addressed in the political context and that of “fake news.”  For an
extreme example, see Andrew Bender, TripAdvisor Gets Totally Punked When Fake Restaurant
Is Ranked No. 1, FORBES (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewbender/
2017/12/08/tripadvisor-gets-totally-punked-when-fake-restaurant-is-ranked-no-1/ (discuss-
ing how an author manipulated TripAdvisor while writing fake reviews and noting other
practices such as payment for reviews by other restaurateurs).  These tactics are not unique
to web platforms.  Philip Napoli has described tactics that newspaper companies used to
use in order to inflate their circulation numbers to sell more advertising, including by
actually printing and distributing copies of the newspaper and throwing them away after
auditors confirmed the circulation.  Philip M. Napoli, What Social Media Platforms Can
Learn from Audience Measurement: Lessons in the Self-Regulation of “Black Boxes” 8
(2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
3115916
85 See discussion and example in Eric Goldman, Understanding the Consumer Review
Fairness Act of 2016, 24 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 4 (2017).
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der gaming.86  They also add complexity to the model by updating and
changing it.  They exploit new data sources to learn how to identify and
remove false reviews,87 including by keeping tabs on the cottage industry of
reputation management (firms that provide gaming services, both technolog-
ically and legally)88 and reducing their influence.  Some of these techniques
were borrowed from Google, which long ago had to learn how to handle
similar problems with “link farms” that are created to improve a website’s
page ranking in Google’s search results.89
These examples illustrate the ubiquity of gaming behavior.  Individuals
and firms use gaming and countergaming strategies in a wide range of con-
texts.  Although the tactics are varied, they can be sorted into the relatively
short list of categories from our taxonomy.
II. GAMEABLE. SO WHAT?
So far, we have established that both the subjects and the designers of
algorithms engage in strategic behavior.  But this on its own says little about
how gaming or the gameability of systems affects society.  In fact, the policy
implications of gaming and countermoves are a mixed bag.  From an auton-
omy perspective, the opportunity to game an algorithm is a positive feature.
The availability of these options helps put the algorithm subjects back in the
driver’s seat, allowing them to resist measurement and judgment to some
extent.90  But gaming can have detrimental effects on a proxy system’s accu-
racy, efficiency, and distributional fairness.  And countergaming moves can-
not fully correct, and sometimes even exacerbate, these problems.
This Part considers how the strategic moves and countermoves of
algorithm subjects and designers affect autonomy, accuracy, efficiency, and
distributional fairness.  It will show that the net effect from a public policy
86 Andy Greenberg, The Saboteurs of Search, FORBES (June 28, 2007), https://www
.forbes.com/2007/06/28/negative-search-google-tech-ebiz-cx_ag_0628seo.html#54963a85
aaa1.
87 For a discussion on the efforts of Amazon to remove false positive reviews, see David
Streitfeld, Giving Mom’s Book Five Stars? Amazon May Cull Your Review, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22,
2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/23/technology/amazon-book-reviews-deleted-
in-a-purge-aimed-at-manipulation.html?mtrref=undefined&gwh=8F44907E11FEF1708D3D
31718E9EBB50&gwt=pay.
88 Jay Greene, Amazon Sues to Block Fake Reviews on Its Site, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 8,
2015), http://www.seattletimes.com/business/amazon/amazon-sues-to-block-fake-reviews-
on-its-site/.
89 Page Rank, Link Farms, and the Future of SEO, CORNELL U.: NETWORKS (Oct. 25, 2017),
https://blogs.cornell.edu/info2040/2017/10/25/page-rank-link-farms-and-the-future-of-
seo/.
90 Conversely, countermoves by the algorithm producer undermine autonomy and are
thus problematic.  At least, this is the case so long as the autonomy of the algorithm
designer is discounted or ignored.  We acknowledge that the use of the term and meta-
phor “driver’s seat” in this context is somewhat ironic, as drivers themselves will most likely
be soon replaced by algorithms facilitating autonomous vehicles.
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perspective will depend heavily on context and on what values a policymaker
wants to optimize and prioritize.91
A. Autonomy and Dignity
Gaming can be beneficial for society and for the people who engage in
it.  The benefits stem from fundamental values of dignity and autonomy, and
gaming is often exercised through resistance—i.e., the right and ability to
protest—and creativity.
Recognizing and exploiting algorithm rules is an exercise in autonomy
for the subject.92  Gaming can restore some control over the personal infor-
mation collected and used in the algorithmic process, and the impression
that a subject is willing to share.  As with other technologies, policymakers
may want to preserve the public’s “freedom to tinker”93 that gives people the
leeway to find innovative ways to manipulate a scoring system.  Or, to invoke
the terminology applied by Julie Cohen, gaming can provide individuals with
the important opportunity to play as opposed to being constantly
“systematized.”94
Tinkering can also promote social utility.  Gaming a system—or interact-
ing with it in ways that go beyond the forms of intended usage—can spur
innovations that allow both the designer and its users to find novel uses for
existing platforms.95  Gaming enhances creativity on both sides of the
game.96
Even the most problematic forms of gaming which do not involve utility-
enhancing innovations, such as when a criminal avoids detection, can be
understood to have some value as a matter of autonomy (though this value is
likely to be outweighed by countervailing interests in the typical case).
91 Incidentally, although it is outside the scope of our project, we believe these four
values are just as relevant and helpful for assessing the costs and benefits when a resource
is switched from a pooled scheme to a discrimination scheme, or when a decisionmaker is
contemplating a switch from a human-based discrimination scheme to an automated one.
However, since our focus is on algorithmic gaming, we focus on that here.  Furthermore,
we are not sure about the completeness of this set for the purposes of evaluating pooled-
versus-discriminating or human-versus-machine tradeoffs.
92 See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Auto-
mated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 29 (2014), for a demonstration of innovative ways in
which users can enhance their autonomy and for a better understanding of the inner work-
ing of algorithms.
93 Pamela Samuelson, Freedom to Tinker, 17 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 563 (2016).  This
argument was often set forth in the copyright context. See, e.g., id.
94 JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF
EVERYDAY PRACTICE 256 (2012) (“[A]utomated systems . . . rely heavily on algorithms that
align and systematize the meanings of data about people and events.”).
95 For more on the linkage between innovation and tinkering, see generally Mary
Bryna Sanger & Martin A. Levin, Using Old Stuff in New Ways: Innovation as a Case of Evolu-
tionary Tinkering, 11 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 88 (1992).
96 Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 NW. U. L.
REV. 655, 671 (2006).
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Thomas Hobbes, for example, believed that individuals have a right to resist
the Leviathan when it poses an existential threat to the subject.97  And when
the state abuses criminal law to persecute a group or to advance an objective
that does not foster the public prosperity, resistance to the detection of
unjust crimes will serve public welfare rather than undermine it.  Beyond
these cases for self-preservation and justified disobedience, there has long
been a strand of legal theory that designs our criminal punishment like a
“fox hunt” in which every “fox” (that is, every criminal) has a fair shot at
escape in a sporting sense.98
Furthermore, systems that eliminate the ability to break the law (or at
least of bending and stretching its rules by gaming them) undermine dignity,
as well.  They do not provide individuals with the prerogative to decide
whether they will voluntarily follow the law.99  Compliance is automatic.  In
those instances, law becomes amoral and will fail to achieve its role as an
instrument that encourages the internalization of specific norms.  These
rationales explain why reasonable minds could embrace gaming in the con-
text of the drug trafficking example described in Part I and could believe
some behavioral leeway is desirable.
Outside the criminal justice context, gaming can be used as a means of
resisting the basis for judgment that an algorithm designer is using—an addi-
tional variation of exercising autonomy.  Gaming, particularly through obfus-
cation,100 but also through the more self-focused tactics, is a grassroots way of
protesting data collection.101  It can also be a protest against discrimination
schemes by forcing the pooling of subjects without the legislature or courts
having to get involved.  And these limited forms of protest promote speech
interests (including the right to protest itself).  A grassroots preference for
pooling can explain why gaming could be celebrated in the employability
scoring and credit scoring examples from Part I.
Whether the subjects’ ability to force a pooling scheme is desirable or
detrimental will depend very much on whether society is better off with dis-
97 Hobbes’s right to rebel may have had a wider scope than existential threats, too. See
SUSANNE SREEDHAR, HOBBES ON RESISTANCE: DEFYING THE LEVIATHAN 166 (2010); see also
Andrea Roth, Trial by Machine, 104 GEO. L.J. 1245, 1283 (2016) (discussing Hobbes’s con-
ception of a “right to resist” punishment and its connection to constitutionally protected
dignity).
98 David M. O’Brien, The Fifth Amendment: Fox Hunters, Old Women, Hermits, and the
Burger Court, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 26, 35–37 (1978) (referencing the “fox hunter’s reason”
in 7 JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 454 (John Bowring ed., 1827)).
Note that some scholars find such notions appropriate for the context of sporting events,
but not for criminal law. See Cheng, supra note 96, at 661 n.26.
99 JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT 120
(2008); Cheng, supra note 96, at 671 nn.79–80 (referring to and relying on the work of
Hannah Arendt and Gary Marx).
100 Obfuscation tactics, as noted in Part I, are often employed as forms of resistance
and protest. See BRUNTON & NISSENBAUM, supra note 10; Marx, supra note 15.
101 See Elizabeth E. Joh, Privacy Protests: Surveillance Evasion and Fourth Amendment Suspi-
cion, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 997, 1022–24 (2013).
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crimination or with cross-subsidized pools.  But in some contexts, the auton-
omy interests of an individual gamer may outweigh other societal interests in
accurately discriminating between subjects.
B. Accuracy
When a set of proxies that is used for an assessment or decision is game-
able, the results are less likely to be accurate.102  Recall that the definition of
gaming we set out in Part I limits gaming to behavior that improves the out-
come of an algorithmic assessment for the data subject without changing the
key factor that the algorithm is approximating.  Gaming takes advantage of a
gap between the key factor and the proxies that the algorithm uses to
approximate it.  Thus, gaming will usually increase error.103  As data subjects
exploit the gap through gaming, the proxies will usually cleave further and
further away from the characteristic that an algorithm is attempting to mea-
sure.  The algorithm will be less predictive and less accurate.  At the extreme,
gaming can completely undermine the goals of an algorithm and render the
system arbitrary.  In fact, gaming could make a system worse than arbitrary
such that the outputs of an algorithm reflect a subject’s willingness to game
and almost nothing else.104
Accuracy problems can cause an algorithm to make decisions in ways
that are not only marginally inefficient but patently unfair.  When algorithms
are used by jails, administrative agencies, or other government deci-
sionmakers, the manipulation of the system can raise concerns that impor-
tant decisions, affecting legal rights and privileges, have been made on the
basis of a flawed and error-prone assessment.  Under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, agencies that use severely gameable systems may fail even the
very deferential standard that courts apply to their factual decisionmaking—
the “arbitrary” and “capricious” standard.105  For example, the famous psy-
chopath test that is used by many prison parole boards is a good idea as long
102 For a similar point, see Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 56, at 160.
103 In rare cases, gaming could improve accuracy if the conduct of gaming does not
change the key characteristic of the gamer in any way, but the gaming itself helps ambi-
tious, creative, or attentive subjects distinguish themselves to correct for preexisting errors
that would have otherwise been biased against them.  For example, a student or job appli-
cant who creatively exploits loopholes in an evaluation process does not actually increase
their skill by doing so, but the creativity and effort involved may mean that they are in fact
more talented than their similar-looking peers.  In these cases, the gaming would unearth
otherwise unobserved talent.  But assuming that the act of gaming does not add any infor-
mation about the key determinant, errors will increase.  They will also be biased in favor of
gamers and against nongamers, an issue relevant in Section II.C focused on distributional
effects.
104 See Nizan Geslevich Packin & Yafit Lev-Aretz, On Social Credit and the Right to be
Unnetworked, 2016 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 339, 372–74; see also Seth Freedman & Ginger Zhe
Jin, The Information Value of Online Social Networks: Lessons from Peer-to-Peer Lending, 51 INT’L J.
INDUS. ORG. 185 (2017) (finding that credit scoring based on social networking is often
rendered inaccurate because of gaming).
105 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012)).
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as the test cannot easily be manipulated by the test subjects who obviously
have a large incentive to pass.  But sociopaths are not famous for telling the
truth.  They are also intelligent and acutely self-interested.  Over time, if
some sociopaths are able to learn or infer what types of answers indicate a
low probability of psychopathy, they will give those answers.106  The results of
the test will therefore become very noisy, and parole decisions will be made
in a more or less random and haphazard fashion.
Judicial proceedings can also violate the rules of evidence or basic due
process guarantees if they rely on proxies that can be manipulated.  Poly-
graph tests, for example, are per se inadmissible as evidence in some jurisdic-
tions because the validity of the standard procedures is in doubt.107  One
problem is that the polygraphs, which measure a set of physiological indica-
tors of stress, seem to be gameable by prepared liars.108  The exclusion of
polygraph tests for this reason is consistent with the more general constitu-
tional limits on unreliable and manipulable forms of evidence.  For example,
confessions that are tortured out of a criminal suspect are a particularly cruel
form of gaming by the state.  In these cases, police and prosecutors attempt
to exploit a heavily weighted proxy for guilt—the confession—by manufac-
turing the input through force.  This is an extreme form of altered inputs.
Fortunately, the law corrects for this gaming behavior because introducing a
coerced confession violates the defendant’s due process rights.109  Note,
however, that the Due Process Clause sets a low bar, and only the most egre-
giously flawed evidence will violate it.110
In the context of policing, a proxy that was useful at one time for estab-
lishing suspicion of criminal behavior and justifying a search can become
insufficient with gaming.  If drug rings learn which highways or geographic
areas are known smuggling routes that contribute to the buildup of reasona-
ble suspicion or probable cause, they will avoid them.  When they do, the
known smuggling route proxy will produce a lower hit rate as it becomes
overwhelmed with false positives.  Police who rely on the smuggling route
may violate the Fourth Amendment rights of the people who are stopped on
the route.
To the extent private users of proxies are making highly consequential
decisions—e.g., about employment or access to credit—policymakers may
rightly be concerned about the arbitrariness of those decisions as well.  On
106 For a review of the literature on this issue that concludes that psychopaths probably
do not actually perform better on polygraphs, see Don Grubin, The Polygraph and Forensic
Psychiatry, 38 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 446 (2010).
107 See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 310–11 (1998); Roth, supra note 97, at
1255–56.
108 The Truth About Lie Detectors (aka Polygraph Tests), AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N (Aug. 5, 2004),
http://www.apa.org/research/action/polygraph.aspx.
109 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
110 “The Constitution, our decisions indicate, protects a defendant against a conviction
based on evidence of questionable reliability, not by prohibiting introduction of the evi-
dence, but by affording the defendant means to persuade the jury that the evidence should
be discounted as unworthy of credit.”  Perry v. New Hampshire, 565 U.S. 228, 237 (2012).
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the other hand, law does not usually intervene with hiring, credit, and other
market decisions, even when they are made on random or sentimental bases.
In employment, for example, the standard approach in at-will employment
states is that employment and retention decisions can be made on any basis
so long as they are not made on the basis of a discrete set of prohibited
factors such as race or a disability that can be accommodated.111  The theory
is not that employment is wholly divorced from merit, but that the market
will do enough to discipline employers without legal intervention.
In any case, even for less consequential decisions made by machines
where fairness is less crucial, gaming will reduce the accuracy of the estimate,
and therefore its efficiency.  If the system as a whole works optimally by differ-
entiating between data subjects, then the net effect of gaming will usually be
negative.  Less accurate credit scoring will result in adverse selection and
tighter credit overall.  Less accurate suspicion algorithms will lead to fewer
arrests of the guilty and more hassle for the innocent.
However, it is important not to overemphasize these efficiency-related
problems brought on by gaming.  Differentiating between people must be
done on some basis, and the proxies used under the best conditions will still
generate error.  So, the right inquiry is not whether proxies should be used at
all (they must, if we are to discriminate between subjects), but whether a set
of proxies that seems to be superior to other methods of decisionmaking can
become inferior under conditions of gaming.  In other words, which set of
decisionmaking rules (whether human- or machine-made) generates overall
greater accuracy while accounting, among other things, for the errors result-
ing from gaming?  The answer to this question will be similar to the solutions
to difficult moral hazard problems in which a system must be designed as
efficiently as possible given the likely influence of strategic behavior.112
The range of countermoves discussed in Part I can be used to minimize
the errors from gaming by reducing the incentive and effect of strategic
behavior and thus enhancing efficiency.  The algorithm producer can
increase the amount of data that is collected on each subject and can (if
necessary) change the model so that easily gameable variables are given less
weight and gaming is costlier for data subjects.  Or the producer can use
machine learning or other means to ensure that the model changes too rap-
111 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, EMP’T LAW § 2.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2015); Samuel
Estreicher & Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Comparative Wrongful Dismissal Law: Reassessing American
Exceptionalism, 92 N.C. L. REV. 343, 347 (2014).  The employment decisions also cannot
cause a disparate impact on one of the protected subgroups unless that impact is justified
by a business purpose (such as differences in relevant experience or training).  The appli-
cation of disparate impact analysis to algorithm-assisted employment decisions is very com-
plex.  See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 4, at 701.
112 See Kenneth J. Arrow, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Further Comment, 58 AM. ECON.
REV. 537 (1968); Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74
(1979); Mark V. Pauly, The Economics of Moral Hazard: Comment, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 531
(1968).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-1\NDL101.txt unknown Seq: 28 21-NOV-18 11:24
28 notre dame law review [vol. 94:1
idly to be easily reverse engineered and gamed.  Alternatively, the producer
can rely on less gameable, more immutable factors.113
None of these countermoves are likely to restore accuracy to achieve
what would be possible without gaming, and generate costs and potential
inefficiencies of their own.  Increasing the amount and variety of data, for
example, is costly, and will introduce problems with overfitting that were
avoidable with more parsimonious models.114  And a shift to rely on immuta-
ble characteristics or to frequently change the model will only make sense if
the decrease in welfare resulting from the shift to these new models is less
than the decreased welfare that arises from gaming.  Also, countermoves that
restore some accuracy can exacerbate problems for the other values consid-
ered in this Part—autonomy, efficiency, and distributional fairness.  Never-
theless, in the world we live in, where people have the means and the rational
incentive to game an algorithm, the marginal benefits of these countermoves
in the form of restored accuracy can outweigh their costs and end up
enhancing both fairness and efficiency.
C. Distributional Fairness
The very term “gaming” implies that there will be winners and losers.  Of
course, any time an algorithm is discriminating between individuals to assign
a score or to dole out a resource or punishment, there will be winners and
losers regardless.  But when we consider the discrimination system under the
condition of gaming, we get a second order of winners and losers, which
might not be the same winners and losers the allocation mechanism (and
those designing it) intended to produce.115  We can compare how individu-
als fare under the gamed system as compared to how they would fare under
the ungamed system.  This analytic exercise can lead to the discovery of unac-
ceptable outcomes that undermine the legitimacy of the overall sorting
scheme.
Generally speaking, the successful gamers will be the winners.116  Non-
gamers (or nonsuccessful ones) will wind up subsidizing the gamers.  But the
incentive, willingness, and ability to game will not be uniform across individu-
113 Of course, some immutable factors like race, sex, age, and health may be off limits
for algorithm designers because of antidiscrimination laws and commitments to social
equity and parity.  We are referring here to the broad range of factors that are difficult for
a person to change—zip code, education, or profession, for example.
114 CHRISTIAN & GRIFFITHS, supra note 13, at 155; PEDRO DOMINGOS, THE MASTER
ALGORITHM 71 (2015).
115 Regulatory design is also concerned with distribution of resources or costs and will
sometimes have distributive (and at times regressive) effects on the population that differ
from what was expected.  This has been explored in a range of areas.  For instance, in the
context of nudges, see Evan Selinger & Kyle Whyte, Is There a Right Way to Nudge? The
Practice and Ethics of Choice Architecture, 5 SOC. COMPASS 923, 931 (2011), noting the “seman-
tic variance” the application of nudges to a broad social segment entails.
116 Although some gamers may counterintuitively wind up worse under a gamed system
if other subjects game even more, and more effectively, than they do.  The distributional
effects will depend on the prevalence and variety of gaming.  Gamers can also be worse off
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als.  When gaming requires information, sophistication, or resources, a
gamed algorithm will wind up with new biases that favor the wealthy and
educated.117  For example, credit scoring can be manipulated to some extent
by those who are able to access special information or to infer a pattern from
their own experiences.  Credit card interest rates fluctuate based on recent
transactions, so gamers may strategically use cash for some purchases, like
alcohol.118  This sort of information, though, tends to appear on specialty
websites or deep in the pages of trade press.  Fully understanding it might
also require a higher education or greater cognitive aptitude.  Even when
successful gaming requires only an investment in time, those with time or the
resources to pay for an assistant will be at an advantage.
The consequences of a discrimination algorithm will also influence who
games and who does not.  For example, the set of rules that law enforcement
agencies use to identify suspicious cars is most likely to be gamed by large
criminal conspiracies.  Because innocent drivers risk a relatively low burden
(a small chance of being pulled over, and a short detention or search) com-
pared to criminal drivers (arrest and incarceration), criminal drivers have
much more of an incentive to game.  Among the criminals, it will be the
criminal networks who have the scale and resources to reverse engineer the
law enforcement agencies’ rules.  Thus, the gamed law enforcement
algorithm will miss more criminals than the ungamed system, and a greater
proportion of the individuals who are stopped or searched will be innocent.
The gaming by more sophisticated criminal operations will redistribute the
burdens of searches onto petty criminals and innocent drivers.
A person’s disposition or personal moral code will also have an effect.
Some forms of gaming like altered inputs (or, put less politely, lying) will not
be an option for some, depending on their personal traits and religious con-
victions.  But even the less blunt forms of gaming, like altered conduct, will
be off limits to some individuals who understand that this conduct will have
negative effects on the algorithm designer or on other subjects.119  Most peo-
if the algorithm designer implements a countergaming strategy that winds up more than
offsetting the advantages of their gaming.
117 See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISH-
ING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE (2007); see also Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Toward a Positive Theory of
Privacy Law, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2010, 2030 (2013) (arguing that the more difficult it is to
game a system, the more detrimental to unsophisticated parties).
118 Or they may make purchases at places where other credit defaulters shop. See Con-
nie Prater, What Electronic Payments Reveal About You to Lenders, CREDITCARDS.COM (Jan. 13,
2009), https://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/credit-card-purchase-privacy-1282
.php.
119 For example, women as a group may be less likely to engage in altered conduct
because they tend to have more cooperative, agreeable, and altruistic dispositions than
men as a group. See Yanna J. Weisberg et al., Gender Differences in Personality Across the Ten
Aspects of the Big Five, 2 FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOL. 178 (2011) (describing and contributing to
the literature on gender differences among the “big five” personality traits and ten person-
ality aspects).
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ple do not want to think of themselves as cheaters,120 so even if we withhold
judgment about the morality of gaming, a person’s own judgment about the
morality of gaming will matter a great deal to their willingness to do it.
Tax loopholes that inhabit a legal gray area will have all three of these
qualities.121  They will be exploited by those with the knowledge, the incen-
tive, and the moral disposition to do something clever that meets the letter,
but not the spirit, of the law.  Their effect, therefore, is a wealth transfer from
the risk averse and virtuous segments of the population to the risk-takers and
morally loose.  This result, especially in the context of tax policy, might be a
feature rather than a bug.  If system planners want to appear equitable while
producing predictably biased outcomes, they may choose gameable rules that
intentionally permit the greedier and more powerful members of society to
take advantage of them.
Then again, other parts of gameable tax policy seem to have been
designed to achieve progressive ends.  For example, while most forms of taxa-
tion on wages are difficult to evade because taxes are withheld by the
employer, others rely on voluntary self-reporting and are easy to evade.
Some believe that tax law enables altered input by small businesses and tip
earners in order to redistribute wealth toward these segments.122
This Robin Hood quality of gaming has very old roots.  Inaccuracy and
leeway in social systems are sometimes understood as moral imperatives to
promote distributive justice.123  Consider, for example, the biblical right of
gleaning by the poor, whereby farm owners are prohibited from picking up
dropped crops so that the poor and hungry can have a chance to feed on
them.124  Ungameable and rigid systems can prevent weaker social partici-
pants from gleaning surpluses in a system, even when there is merely a de
minimus cost to algorithm designers or to other subjects.
Countergaming strategies that will be used to reduce the inaccuracies of
gaming can cause their own distributional effects.  When the algorithm
model is altered, the errors will be redistributed, sometimes in ways that are
regressive.  If an algorithm model is redesigned to put more weight on fac-
tors that are immutable or hard to game, such as zip code, income, or occu-
pation, errors might be reallocated to the disadvantage of people who live in
worse neighborhoods, have low income, or hold blue-collar jobs.  If an
algorithm is frequently changed, it will reduce gaming overall by driving up
120 See Shana Lebowitz, Behavioral Economist Dan Ariely Reveals the Primary Reason People
Lie and Cheat, BUS. INSIDER (May 21, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/dan-ariely-on-
why-people-lie-and-cheat-2015-5 (stating that dishonesty is almost always caused by a con-
flict of interest, and that individuals are often unaware of these conflicting interests).  In
the article, Ariely notes: “We do have these biases and incentives, and we don’t see how
they operate on us . . . . And because of that we behave badly.” Id.
121 Tax laws use a set of rules that we are analogizing here to decision-making algo-
rithms.  Tax rules are used to determine tax liability, which is a sort of estimate of a house-
hold’s “fair” share of public spending.
122 See, e.g., Cheng, supra note 96 at 678.
123 We thank Helen Nissenbaum for this insight.
124 See Leviticus 19:9.
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the costs for gamers, but it will therefore reward the most dedicated gamers
or those with the greatest resources who continue to reverse engineer the
rules.
Other model revisions can raise problems, too, which overlap with con-
cerns related to antidiscrimination policy.  For example, consider a school
that asks for filing a form asking for demographic information in order to
help the algorithm designer (the admissions committee) improve diversity.
The form may offer the option “decline to state” for people who highly value
their privacy regardless of race.  In a nongaming world, the algorithm
designer might assume that privacy preferences are uniformly distributed
across race and would treat the “decline to state” response as equivalent to
missing data—essentially treating the applicant as an amalgam of the races in
proportion to the racial makeup of the applicants who reported race.  In a
world with gaming, however, white, straight, and male students may elect
“decline to state” in order to avoid any disadvantage that would come from
reporting race, sexual orientation, and gender.  Anticipating this (or learn-
ing it from past admissions cycles), the school would then treat “decline to
state” exactly the same as they treat “white.”  Or perhaps a penalty would be
imposed based on the abject self-interest exhibited by most of the people
selecting that option.  (This is an example of the “unraveling effect”—where
missing information is imputed based on the incentives of the nonre-
porter.)125  The losers in this case are the minority applicants who were will-
ing to forego the advantages of reporting in order to maintain their privacy,
but may not have realized that they could face a penalty.  Similar dynamics
might occur with almost every one of the examples detailed above.
Furthermore, some countergaming strategies will redistribute error so
that its distributional effects for most people are small, but are severe for a
small segment of the population.  For example, if the police set up a check-
point at a transportation bottleneck in order to tackle avoidance gaming
strategies, the false positive errors (unnecessary stops and searches) will be
particularly bad for people who live near the bottleneck and rely on that
section of road to get to work or the nearest city.
Each of these countergaming measures redistributes the benefits and
burdens of a discrimination system, and may do so in a way that is regressive,
clumpy, or in some way unfair.  And some of these redistributions will have
negative effects on the discrete and insular minority groups that are pro-
tected under equal protection doctrine and other antidiscrimination laws.
The problems of thoughtlessly reproducing discriminatory patterns of the
past are real, but they have also been exaggerated in some of the more pessi-
mistic parts of the literature (an issue beyond our current scope).126
To conclude, we return to the examples from Part I.  Every one of them
will have distributional effects when gamed.  Gaming the drug courier detec-
125 Scott R. Peppet, Unraveling Privacy: The Personal Prospectus and the Threat of a Full-
Disclosure Future, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1153, 1156 (2011).
126 See O’NEIL, supra note 4; Margaret Hu, Algorithmic Jim Crow, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 633
(2017).
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tion algorithms will favor the wealthier and better-organized criminals as
opposed to their small-time competitors.  Employability scores are more
likely to be gamed by better-educated job applicants who have sufficient
information and opportunity to clean up their social media accounts.  The
same is true for debtors and insured individuals who have better information
about newer methods for assessing credit and health risks.  Whereas for the
corporate reputation example, smaller and newer firms are actually at an
advantage relative to older and larger firms since there is a smaller amount of
historical information about those firms to overwhelm with false reviews or
link farms.127  In addition, newcomers may take greater risks if they lack the
reserve that comes with the reputation and moral standing of older, more
established firms.
D. Other Inefficiencies
The last two Sections have focused on two important sources of ineffi-
ciency.  The cost to accuracy that gaming and countertactics will cause are
first-order inefficiencies, equivalent to the direct costs of accidents using
Guido Calabresi’s model of social costs from the torts system.128  The distri-
butional effects discussed in the last Section track second-order inefficien-
cies—that is, the extent to which errors are distributed in unfair and
detrimental ways.  That leaves third-order inefficiencies—the costs of the sys-
tem itself.  That is, the wasteful effort that gamers take on to exploit the sys-
tem, and that algorithm designers go through to reinforce it.  These are the
incidental costs of engaging in gaming.
Some of these costs are concrete.  An individual who drives a long way to
avoid a police checkpoint will spend time and gas in the effort, as well as miss
out on actions he is interested in carrying out (not to mention the environ-
mental implications of unnecessary gas emissions).  But some costs are psyco-
logical—the persistent worry and vigilance required to take as much
advantage as possible from an algorithm.  Thus, the unfortunate truth is that
even if gaming and countergaming tactics lead to a position with no loss of
accuracy and no damage to distributional fairness, the processes themselves
will add theoretically unnecessary drag and generate opportunity costs—the
activities an individual could do rather than spending time gaming and
countergaming.  Of course, gaming can also motivate individuals to innovate,
and could therefore bring some positive, if unintended, advances that pro-
mote science and social welfare.129
The costs of gaming have drawn special attention in the context of
obfuscation.  These noted methods can potentially generate substantial
127 Of course, established firms may be able to leverage their greater resources and
deeper pockets to overcome these comparative disadvantages.  This includes outright buy-
ing the small competitor.  Victor Luckerson, How Google Perfected the Silicon Valley Acquisi-
tion, TIME (April 15, 2015), http://time.com/3815612/silicon-valley-acquisition/.
128 See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1970).
129 Samuelson, supra note 93, at 571.
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externalities, especially in instances that entail collective actions striving to
provide false signals.  When doing so, the entire data ecosystem is contami-
nated by inaccurate data, which undermine efficiency.130  For instance, con-
sider the damage resulting from false (either negative or positive) reviews
discussed in Example 4 or the inaccuracies spread regarding individuals’ true
location in Example 3.
III. LAW AND GAMING
Laws can and often do affect the algorithm game.  Background health
and public safety laws can reduce gaming in a variety of incidental ways by
limiting the range of conduct that people can engage in.131  Algorithm
designers are also constrained by laws of general applicability that may, for
example, limit surveillance for general privacy objectives (without any clear
desire to facilitate gaming or to frustrate countergaming tactics).132  But law
is also replete with examples in which gaming is either directly supported or
frustrated by design and intention.  In other words, an abundance of legal
levers enables (or disables) the algorithm’s gameability.
As we work with the examples from the gaming perspective, it will
become clear that certain policy values are given preferential, even exclusive
consideration over the other, competing values.  For instance, privacy rights
might enable gaming at a cost to accuracy or fairness.133  In other contexts,
safety or security concerns might lead to policies that reduce the opportunity
for gaming without regulators fully appreciating the gaming-related implica-
tions.  But the examples resist any overarching theory about how the compet-
ing values can be balanced.  Policy considerations regarding gaming have
been latent to the extent they have occurred at all, and seem to be driven by
instinct and custom.  This does not necessarily mean that any of the existing
laws encouraging or thwarting gaming are wrong, of course.  But they do
reflect normative commitments that conflict in ways that are difficult to
explain.  At the very least, explanation is mostly lacking in the policy and
130 This view and counterarguments are discussed in BRUNTON & NISSENBAUM, supra
note 10.
131 For instance, trespass rules and laws requiring motor vehicles to stay on public road-
ways will put some limits on what a person can do to avoid a police checkpoint, even
though the primary purpose of those laws has nothing to do with gaming.
132 General privacy rules seem like a natural place to start as a first line of artillery to
support gaming or as a first line of defense against countergaming strategies.  But it is a
blunt tool for the issues we are discussing.  If the biggest problem facing policymakers are
the deleterious effects of gaming and countergaming, there are narrower, finer-grained
tools that place limitations on data collection.  Conversely, even when there is no general
restriction on data collection, the government may still choose to induce gaming or limit
countergaming strategies using legal rules designed for that narrower purpose.  Therefore,
privacy law should be deployed where there is a data control problem or when other pri-
vacy-related interests are compromised, and not necessarily as a response to gaming or
countergaming corrections.
133 See Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Property Rights, and Misrepresentations, 12 GA. L. REV.
455 (1978); Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 403 (1978).
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legal literature.  Moreover, to the extent existing laws are in line with a coher-
ent public policy, a deliberate evaluation of them in light of the competing
values described in Part II may expose other areas where regulation should
constrain and remodel the algorithm game.
This Part describes areas of U.S. (and to a limited extent—EU) law that
directly, yet often inadvertently, affect gaming and countergaming tech-
niques.  It concludes by showing how future regulation would benefit from
an initial analysis and prioritization of the societal values discussed in Part II
(autonomy, accuracy, distributional fairness, and system efficiency) so that
the law can be crafted to serve the most pressing values in the least intrusive
way.  Before proceeding, it is important to note that the law is not the only
enabling gaming factor.  Design features, human psychology, and the rele-
vant context all have a substantial impact on the ability to game.134  Yet these
elements are often beyond the state and regulators’ reach.  The law, however,
is the fundamental tool that can allow society to pull various levers in an
attempt to reign in gaming practices, or to set them free.  These legal choices
will be harder to make as artificial intelligence, machine learning, and com-
prehensive data collection increase in pace and complexity.  It is well worth-
while thinking about the legal strategies that have been implemented in the
small data era to prepare for the policy debates we must have in anticipation
of big data problems.135
A. Laws Promoting Gaming and Impeding Countergaming Strategies
Laws that promote gaming often do so while striving to enhance the
autonomy or dignity of the relevant subjects.  This is, after all, the value
described in Section II.A that unambiguously points in a pro-gaming
direction.
Privacy laws typically use a set of Fair Information Practice Principles
(“FIPPs”) to enhance the autonomy and dignity of people who are subject to
a surveillance or decision-making protocol.136  These FIPPs require compa-
nies and government entities to provide certain technical and procedural
safeguards such as transparency, informed consent, correction, and use limi-
tation that tend to increase the opportunities for gaming.
For instance, laws requiring consent before collecting or using personal
information related to them are designed for gaming because consent is the
mechanism that puts the subjects in control and allows them to opt out when
they think they will get a bad outcome.  Use limitations have a similar effect,
as they allow individuals to control the firm’s future use of data pertaining to
134 Lawrence Lessig includes design features (architecture) as one of the fundamental
forces of regulation and practical constraint. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND THE OTHER
LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 33–34 (1999).
135 Ferguson, supra note 65, at 331 (using the term “small data doctrine”).
136 Marc Rotenberg, Fair Information Practices and the Architecture of Privacy (What Larry
Doesn’t Get), 2001 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 16.
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them, and in that way block countergaming moves.137  Regulations that
require companies to be transparent about how they process and analyze per-
sonal data both enable gamers to manipulate the system and hamper the
firm’s ability to use countergaming measures like complexity or constantly
changing predictive models.  Rules that mandate consumer access to the per-
sonal data collected about them as well as the right to correct it can also help
gamers understand the algorithm and exploit or even abuse the correction
mechanisms.  These common privacy-enhancing measures can facilitate the
alteration of inputs (in the way of “correcting” data that might put them at a
disadvantage), the use of avoidance or altered conduct strategies to improve
an anticipated score, and even the design of coordinated obfuscation tactics.
Residents in the European Union have much more control over the col-
lection and use of information that pertains to them than Americans do.
The EU Data Protection Directive138 and the General Data Protection Regu-
lation139 are designed to enhance the residents’ dominion over the percep-
tion and judgment that other people or companies may have about them,
favoring the interests of the judged (the data subject) over the judger (the
data controller).
In the European Union, the connection between one of these rights—
the right of correction—and gaming was illustrated by the plaintiff in Google
Spain v. Agencia Espan˜ola de Proteccio´n de Datos, who successfully established
the right to be forgotten (or, at least, to be de-indexed) by Google.140  Here,
the plaintiff sought to de-index old news reports about debts that he had
once defaulted on, but which had since been resolved.  The European Court
of Justice recognized the plaintiff’s right to demand the delisting because the
old debt information was “inadequate, irrelevant, or excessive.”141  A more
honest account of the right to be forgotten is that it can be used by a person
to obscure negative information about himself, even if the information can
be properly weighted to improve a viewer’s assessment of the plaintiff’s
creditworthiness, responsibility, or general character.142
137 See Tal Z. Zarsky, Incompatible: The GDPR in the Age of Big Data, 47 SETON HALL L.
REV. 995, 1005–09 (2017), for an explanation of the purpose limitations required by the
newest European privacy regulations—the General Data Protection Regulation.
138 Council Directive 95/46, 1995 O.J. (L 281) (EC).  These rights were further
strengthened in the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which became enforcea-
ble in 2018 and mandatorily applies to all member states. See infra note 139.
139 Commission Regulation 2016/679 of Apr. 27, 2016, On the Protection of Natural
Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of such
Data, 2016 O.J. (L 119) [hereinafter Commission Regulation 2016/679].
140 Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Espan˜ola de Proteccio´n de Datos, 2014
E.C.R. 317.
141 Id. ¶ 92.
142 Note that a somewhat different version of this right was introduced into the GDPR,
and thus will apply across the content directly. See Commission Regulation 2016/679,
supra note 139, at art. 17.  The regulation features exceptions, however, including
instances where processing is necessary “for the performance of a task carried out in the
public interest.” Id. art. 17(3)(b).
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Indeed, the individual right articulated in this case is not to enhance
accuracy as much as it is to enhance the subject’s autonomy and control, no
matter the effect on the viewer.  It is, in other words, the right to game.  This
has been even more apparent in other cases, such as when doctors tried to
exercise the right to be forgotten to scrub away evidence about past malprac-
tice (though their requests were apparently denied by Google).143
The EU Data Protection Directive provides a transparency measure that
promotes control and enables gaming, too.  Every consumer has a right to
understand the logic of processing (the algorithmic decisionmaking) that he
or she is subjected to, at least when it is automated and has a substantial
impact on the data subject.144  Of course, having this information allows for
gaming of all sorts.  In practice, the transparency requirements are often bal-
anced against the firm’s interest in trade secrets (which require opacity),145
but the potential problems from gaming rarely receive any consideration.146
Autonomy and dignity of the subject do not have the same pride of place
in American law.  Although the FIPPs were originally developed in the
United States, they have not been adopted into law except in narrow, sector-
specific circumstances.147  The closest comes in the form of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA),148 which includes limited rights to explanation and
to correct data.  But those rights are carefully constructed to limit gaming
and maintain accuracy.149  Whether these laws pertain to new forms of credit
and employability scoring (like those described in Example 3) is still unclear.
Nevertheless, even U.S. law occasionally protects a person’s opportunity
to game a system.  Examples are more prevalent in criminal procedural pro-
tections.  Consider, for example, the information that can be inferred when
police ask for consent to search a vehicle, home, or personal item.  An in-
depth analysis of this specific issue allows us to demonstrate how the law at
times inadvertently enables gaming and what lies in the balance.
If police do not have probable cause to suspect that contraband will be
discovered, then a subject’s consent is a necessary prerequisite to the search,
143 See Andrew Neville, Is It a Human Right to be Forgotten? Conceptualizing the World View,
15 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 157, 162 (2017).
144 Commission Regulation 2016/679, supra note 139, at art. 13(2)(f), art. 22.
145 This is especially so in Germany and Austria. See Sandra Wachter et al., Why a Right
to Explanation of Automated Decision-Making Does Not Exist in the General Data Protection Regula-
tion, 7 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 76 (2017).
146 In the United States, however, a recent study which requested information regard-
ing state-run algorithmic decision-making processes received multiple refusals, some based
on trade secret concerns, while others on fears of future gaming. See Brauneis and Good-
man, supra note 56, at 153–63.
147 But see Rotenberg, supra note 136, at 9–10.
148 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).
149 Id. §§ 1681i(a)(1)(A), 1681g(f)(1)(C); see also Citron & Pasquale, supra note 92, at
17.  Similarly, the Privacy Act of 1974, which constrains the federal government’s collection
and use of data, permits individuals to request a correction of incorrect data, but also
permits the government entity to deny the request in order to reduce the risk of strategic
false requests.  5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(2)(B) (2012).
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and the subject is of course free to withhold consent.150  But very few people
refuse consent to a police search when asked.  If consent is most often denied
by subjects who are hiding contraband or evidence of a crime (those with
something to hide), then the refusal to give consent could be sufficient by
itself to create probable cause.  At the very least, refusal may provide the dol-
lop of additional suspicion needed to clear the bar for probable cause in
situations where preexisting information has already brought the police close
to the probable cause standard.  With probable cause established and the
subject on notice, an exigency could justify a warrantless search on the spot.
But there is an obvious Fourth Amendment problem if courts allow the
refusal of consent to be taken into account in the assessment of suspicion;
inferring suspicion from declined consent would undermine the suspect’s
power to autonomously and voluntarily consent to the search.151  Thus,
courts do not allow this particular sort of inferential unraveling.
This prohibition on consent-based unraveling can be quite powerful for
the gaming criminal suspects.  Consider the case where a subject has contra-
band in his bedroom, but he believes it is so well hidden (behind a false
panel or loose floorboard, for example) that he decides to consent to a
search.  This can be a shrewd use of consent; if the police search and find
nothing, the suspicion that they had been developing against the target may
be discounted or rejected entirely, and the investigation can end.  What hap-
pens when the target abruptly revokes consent, perhaps after observing that
the searching officer is headed toward the false panel or is listening to his
footsteps for loose floorboards?  At least two circuit courts have decided that
the revocation of consent cannot be held against the suspect any more than
an initial refusal of consent can.152
These Fourth Amendment limits on incriminating information that the
police observe, but may not count, are an invitation for gaming.  Criminals
have the opportunity to decline a consent-based search, but they also have
the option of allowing the search and then calling it off if the strategy does
not work.  Not surprisingly, although the courts have expressly committed to
an autonomy principle that permits gaming, they have also showed a dislike
for gaming by supporting countergaming strategies of the police that main-
tain the suspect’s opportunities to withdraw consent only in a formal,
hypertechnical way.  For example, courts require targets to revoke consent
with crystal clear language before a search has to stop.  For example, yelling
out “[t]his is ridiculous” when the defendant was escorted to a police car was
150 Withholding consent is not as simple as it may seem, as courts will consider consent
to be voluntarily given even when the police or the context exert strong pressure to agree.
See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973).
151 The power of consent could be restored if innocent people changed their behavior
and more often declined consent in protest or to avoid the hassle of a fruitless police
search.
152 United States v. Carter, 985 F.2d 1095, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Mason v. Pulliam, 557
F.2d 426, 428–29 (5th Cir. 1977).
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not sufficient.153  And if a defendant nervously blurts out his revocation of
consent, the suspicious manner in which consent is revoked can contribute
to suspicion and help justify an unconsented probable cause search.154  This
betrays an uneasiness in the caselaw with respect to the commitments to
autonomy (and to gaming) and the state interests in accuracy (and in
countergaming policing).  We think the constitutional policymaking should
be more honest about the tension between these interests and bring the
debate out into the open air.
We raise this example also to show that the taxonomy developed in Part
I has ambiguous application in some circumstances, or is potentially incom-
plete.  While we are confident that strategic withdrawal of consent is a form
of gaming, reasonable minds can differ on whether it is a form of avoidance,
of altered conduct, or something else altogether.  Likewise, police inferences
about the relationship between withdrawn consent and guilt are also hard to
categorize among the countergaming strategies.  The best fit is probably reli-
ance on immutable characteristics since the police in this situation would be
exploiting information (withdrawn consent) that the subject cannot change
without considerable cost (allowing a police search to go forward).
Other examples where the law facilitates gaming are easier to place in
the taxonomy.  Criminal due process rights and freedom of information laws,
for example, provide the public—including future law enforcement evad-
ers—with access to information about how the government conducts its oper-
ations, including its criminal investigations.155  They therefore enhance
relevant parties’ ability to engage in avoidance and altered conduct.156  Since
police officers must provide criminal defendants with an explanation about
how probable cause was established in their case, the transparency allows
criminal rings to exploit what they learn about investigation tactics.  Police
sometimes avoid transparency by conducting a second, shadow investigation
with new evidence after the suspect’s case has already been made.  This
deceit is often done for illegitimate purposes, like to cover up an unconstitu-
153 See United States v. Gray, 369 F.3d 1024, 1026 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Withdrawal of con-
sent need not be effectuated through particular ‘magic words,’ but an intent to withdraw
consent must be made by unequivocal act or statement.”).
154 Carter, 985 F.2d at 1096.  Similarly, targets of criminal investigations who are
stopped for questions are allowed to lie just as they are allowed to simply refuse to answer
questions.  However, if they get caught in a lie, this metainformation can be used to
increase suspicion.
155 But note that freedom of information laws, such as the Freedom of Inforamtion Act,
always have a broad exception to shield law enforcement tactics from public disclosure. See
Frequently Asked Questions: What are Exclusions?, FOIA.GOV, https://www.foia.gov/faq.html#
exclusions (last visited Sept. 20, 2018); Frequently Asked Questions: What are FOIA Exemptions?,
FOIA.GOV, https://www.foia.gov/faq.html#exemptions (last visited Sept. 20, 2018).  For a
discussion of these exemptions and their link to antigaming, see Brauneis & Goodman,
supra note 56, at 161.
156 It is worth noting that these legal requirements may also impede countergaming
strategies by effectively requiring that an algorithm be interpretable and subject to a right
of explanation. See Brennan-Marquez, supra note 6.
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tional or controversial portion of the original investigation.  But the police
may also be enticed to do this when the original means of building suspicion
were legal and routine, but vulnerable to future gaming.
Criminal trial procedure rights also preserve a certain amount of gaming
by defendants.  Recall that in the discussion of lie detectors in Part II, one of
the courts’ justifications for prohibiting polygraph evidence was to preserve
the jury’s right to determine the credibility of witnesses for themselves.157
This justification is unrelated to accuracy; it secures the jury’s role to assess
veracity even if we know that the jury will be less skilled at the task than a
machine.  Although the United States v. Scheffer Court characterized this right
as one belonging to the jury, the jury’s interests in this, and all other aspects
of criminal cases, work in service of the defendant.158  Thus, when the jury’s
interest to determine the credibility of a defendant-witness is invoked despite
the possible losses in accuracy, the courts are actually giving the defendant a
right to gamble and even game the jury’s sympathies and analytical flaws.159
In fact, the criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial
can also be understood as a right to game.  Indeed, the right to a jury trial is
justified principally on legitimacy grounds—that a subset of one’s peers is
more expert and therefore more “correct” than an elite, insulated judge
could ever be about matters of retribution and punishment.  But the practic-
ing criminal defense bar understands that a jury trial often helps criminal
defendants because of the jury’s manipulability and analytical flaws that make
the jury less accurate than a sitting judge.160  Exercising the right to a jury
trial invokes the shortcomings of almost every single value described in Part
II—inaccuracy, perverse distributional effects, and additional costs and ineffi-
ciencies.  The right to a jury trial is therefore a legal endorsement of the
human interests in autonomy and gaming.
Outside the criminal context, there are a few additional areas where
American law facilitates gaming to promote autonomy and distributional fair-
ness over the interest in accuracy.
For instance, some states’ laws interfere with employers’ ability to gather
extensive information from social networks for the purpose of employability
scoring.  These states prohibit employers from demanding passwords to the
157 United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 309 (1998) (“Rule 707 serves several legiti-
mate interests in the criminal trial process.  These interests include ensuring that only
reliable evidence is introduced at trial, preserving the court members’ role in determining
credibility, and avoiding litigation that is collateral to the primary purpose of the trial.”).
158 Jason Kreag, The Jury’s Brady Right, 98 B.U. L. REV. 345 (2018) (discussing the jury’s
right to access all potentially exculpating information (as a right that serves the interests of
the defendant)).
159 In other words, they will alter their conduct to improve their odds of acquittal.
160 Note, too, that the selection of the jury is another game within the game that leads
to efforts like asking probative questions during voir dire and, in jurisdictions that allow it,
googling each prospective juror to try to find more information from social media
accounts.  John G. Browning, As Voir Dire Becomes Voir Google, Where Are the Ethical Lines
Drawn, JURY EXPERT, May–June 2013, at 11, 11.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-1\NDL101.txt unknown Seq: 40 21-NOV-18 11:24
40 notre dame law review [vol. 94:1
social network profiles from applicants and employees.161  Employers in
those states can only gather the information that is publicly available, so indi-
viduals may game the employability scoring by carefully managing what types
of information are shared publicly and what types are shared only to private
groups.
In addition, statutes that regulate employers and creditors sometimes
create narrow, incisive prohibitions on the use of information that may have
statistical value to an algorithm but that tend to penalize people based on a
factor that is not in their control (and is therefore, to some extent, immuta-
ble).  The result is often to nudge employers and creditors to use factors that
are in the subject’s control and are therefore gameable.  Antidiscrimination
laws that prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, sex, disability, and
other protected classes are examples—at least to the extent that these factors
actually add any statistical accuracy to algorithm assessments—but they are
generally embraced and highly valued by society because of their historical
overuse as well as the substantial implications of relying on these forms of
discrimination.162  At times, these discrimination prohibitions are extended
to their close proxies, such as when the practice of redlining based on resi-
dential location is a close proxy for race in mortgage financing.163  These
laws of course serve very important social functions, but it is also important to
recognize that limits on immutable factors have an interesting side effect of
increasing the use of mutable, gameable ones.
A good example where these tradeoffs ought to be more carefully con-
sidered would be the “ban the box” laws that have passed in a handful of
states.164  These laws prevent employers from inquiring about whether pro-
spective employees have ever been convicted of a crime.  When these inquir-
ies are routine and weighted heavily, they make it very difficult for
rehabilitated criminal offenders to get a job.  Since a convict cannot alter his
status as a convicted criminal, his opportunities to work around, or game,
this recruiting algorithm are quite limited.  He is constrained to either
lying—false inputs—or to waiting and hoping that nonconvicts begin to iden-
tify themselves as former convicts in order to protest and obfuscate the
algorithm.  Neither option is good.  “Ban the box” laws force employers
either to pool ex-cons with other, otherwise similar, applicants, and accept a
slightly increased chance that the employee will be unreliable or dangerous,
161 State Social Media Privacy Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/
research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/state-laws-prohibiting-access-
to-social-media-usernames-and-passwords.aspx (last updated Jan. 2, 2018).
162 See Zarsky, supra note 34.
163 Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,266, 18,268 (Apr.
15, 1994) (“Redlining refers to the illegal practice of refusing to make residential loans or
imposing more onerous terms on any loans made because of the predominant race,
national origin, etc., of the residents of the neighborhood in which the property is located.
Redlining violates both the FH Act and the ECOA.”).
164 See David B. Weisenfeld, Ban the Box Laws by State and Municipality, XPERTHR (June
8, 2018), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/legal-and-compliance/state-and-local-
updates/xperthr/pages/ban-the-box-laws-by-state-and-municipality-.aspx.
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or to attempt to separate the unreliable prospects from the reliable ones
using other information and means.165  That is, if the employer is motivated
to screen out employees who have a higher risk of danger, disloyalty, or
absenteeism, they still can.  The “ban the box” laws simply force them to use
proxies other than conviction status.  These alternative factors may be easier
to game than the immutable ex-con status.
Finally, the constitutional right to speak and assemble anonymously also
embraces gaming for valid and noble reasons.  The value from anonymously
speaking and assembling comes from removing the disincentives that people
would otherwise have to bear in order to take an unpopular political or social
position.166  The right to make speech without identifying the speaker means
that listeners are less likely to know who to blame when they encounter
speech they do not like, and that the government will not be able to compel
the identification of the speaker unless the speaker has engaged in some
predicate illegal act.167  The same reasoning constrains state actors from
requiring people to be identifiable when they assemble,168 but courts have
been much more tolerant of state interventions that “out” the identities of
people assembling in public.  For example, state antimask laws (enforced
with particular zeal against groups like the Ku Klux Klan and fans of the band
Insane Clown Posse)169 have survived constitutional scrutiny because of the
state interests in identifying common criminals and mayhem makers who use
a mask solely to evade detection by law enforcement.170
The legal protection of anonymity enables gaming on several levels.
First, it undermines the surveillance that lenders and insurance companies
might otherwise try to exercise, leaving the individuals space to avoid detec-
tion.  Second, and especially in the digital realm, anonymity enables obfusca-
tion schemes.  These schemes are usually promoted by anonymous online
activists, and the targets of the obfuscation must overcome several procedural
steps in order to get a court to unmask the speakers.171  Rules and laws
165 But see Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Privacy Versus Antidiscrimination, 75 U. CHI. L. REV.
363 (2008).
166 See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Talley v. California,
362 U.S. 60 (1960).
167 See Andrew Crocker, Note, Trackers That Make Phone Calls: Considering First Amend-
ment Protection for Location Data, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 619, 639–44 (2013).
168 See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
169 See Nathan Rabin, The Secret Lives of Juggalos, TIME (Jan. 14, 2014), http://time.com/
2980/the-secret-lives-of-juggalos/; Lydia Wheeler, Why ‘Juggalos’ Are Marching on DC, HILL
(Sept. 16, 2017), http://thehill.com/regulation/350952-jokes-aside-juggalos-say-dc-protest-
march-is-serious.
170 See, e.g., Church of the Am. Knights of the KKK v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197 (2d Cir.
2004).
171 To obtain court orders, litigants have to provide some proof consistent with the
claim they would bring against the speaker. See Jason M. Shepard & Genelle Belmas, Ano-
nymity, Disclosure and First Amendment Balancing in the Internet Era: Developments in Libel, Copy-
right, and Election Speech, 15 YALE J.L. & TECH. 92 (2012) (providing caselaw examples
throughout the article).
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impeding the identification and unmasking process are therefore enabling
gaming.172
To demonstrate the link between gaming and anonymity, consider the
corporate reputation example, Example 4, that we describe in Part I.  In that
example, companies attempt to game the rating systems of intermediaries by
creating positive reviews about their business and negative reviews about
their competitors.  These tactics, particularly the negative reviews, could con-
stitute actionable defamation.  But the protections for online anonymous
speech make litigating against these defamers very difficult.  Therefore, these
forms of gaming are less costly and more attractive to the firms that are will-
ing to do it.  Outside the United States, some jurisdictions limit the influence
of online anonymous speech by requiring the usage of real names, such as
China,173 or requiring speakers to register their accounts under their real
name, which was previously used in South Korea.174  Of course, at least in the
case of China, the main objective is not the reduction of gaming behavior by
companies but by dissidents.175  But both have the effect of limiting some
forms of gaming.
Returning to the physical world, the validity of antimask laws may
become more interesting when facial recognition technologies expand to
cover more public spaces.176  Cameras and computers equipped with facial
recognition software and an appropriate database of portraits will theoreti-
cally be able to identify, track, and profile people in real time and real space
in the near future.177  Although these technologies will probably not lead
very many people to take up full-blown masks, some people may experiment
with hair and makeup styles, like those promoted by CV Dazzle, that confuse
facial recognition technologies even though an acquaintance would easily be
172 In addition, courts have upheld standard contract clauses used by internet service
providers that set the jurisdiction for unmasking requests in the state of California, where
unmasking requests are rarely granted. See Yelp, Inc. v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning, Inc., 770
S.E.2d 440, 444–46 (Va. 2015).
173 Josh Chin, China Is Requiring People to Register Real Names for Some Internet Services; The
Onus Is on Blogs, Instant-Messaging and Other Services to Implement Effective Tracking Systems,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 4, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-to-enforce-real-name-regis
tration-for-internet-users-1423033973.
174 Choe Sang-Hun, South Korean Court Rejects Online Name Verification Law, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/24/world/asia/south-korean-court-
overturns-online-name-verification-law.html?mcubz=3.  Laws can also sharply discourage
the enabling of such online speech by enhancing the facilitating intermediary’s liability for
the possible harms of such content. See e.g., Defamation Act 2013, c. 26 § 5(3)(a) (Eng.).
175 Chin, supra note 173.
176 For a discussion of the linkage between masks and online deanonymization, see
Margot Kaminski, Real Masks and Real Name Policies: Applying Anti-Mask Case Law to Anony-
mous Online Speech, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 815 (2013).
177 Joel R. Reidenberg, Essay, Privacy in Public, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 141 (2014).  The
growing use of private drones equipped with cameras will also contribute to this concern.
See Margot E. Kaminski, Essay, Drone Federalism: Civilian Drones and the Things They Carry, 4
CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 57 (2013).
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able to recognize the subject.178  These techniques, such as the example in
Figure 1, are also unlikely to be taken up by great numbers of people.  But
courts may one day have to wade through the murky law179 to decide
whether anti-Dazzle statutes are appropriately tailored to state interests in
facial recognition accuracy or whether they intrude too greatly on a person’s
First Amendment autonomy interests to assemble anonymously and to
express their aesthetic identities.180  Whatever decision the court reaches, it
would be bound to have an indirect effect on gaming, and courts would be
prudent to weigh in on this issue in their analyses.
FIGURE 1: CV DAZZLE
B. Laws Impeding Gaming and Promoting Countergaming Strategies
American law is also chock full of examples where the law impedes gam-
ing and promotes countergaming.  Prohibitions on deceit—that is, on
altered inputs—are particularly common.  It is illegal to misstate information
on a tax return,181 to lie under oath,182 and to report factual misstatements
178 See infra Figure 1.  Special glasses can have the same effect on some facial recogni-
tion technologies. See James Vincent, These Glasses Trick Facial Recognition Software into
Thinking You’re Someone Else, VERGE (Nov. 3, 2016), https://www.theverge.com/2016/11/
3/13507542/facial-recognition-glasses-trick-impersonate-fool.
179 In addition to the antimasking laws, Calo et al. contemplate whether applying Daz-
zle makeup might constitute a violation of antihacking laws, such as the Computer Fraud
and Abuse Act. See Calo et al., supra note 14, at 13, 16.
180 Some states have already passed statutes that ban the use of special plastic films that
cover license plates and reflect light in a way that obfuscates automatic license plate read-
ers.  For example, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-2354(D) (2018).  These laws, though, are
not subject to constitutional scrutiny since motor vehicles are much more regulable under
the Fourth and First Amendments, and since the very purpose of the license plate is to
allow tracking in public areas.
181 26 U.S.C. § 7207 (2012).
182 18 U.S.C. § 1621(1) (2012).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-1\NDL101.txt unknown Seq: 44 21-NOV-18 11:24
44 notre dame law review [vol. 94:1
in SEC disclosures.183  Since gaming is risky given the liability exposure,
these rules create vast datasets of truthful information that can be used by
decision-making algorithms.184
Trademark law and commercial torts constrain businesses from gaming
consumers’ assessments of quality by polluting their information with mis-
leading signals about the source of a product.185  In other words, they are
forbidden from selecting names which will lead users to confuse their brand
with another, reputable one.
The law also permits a large range of algorithm designer self-help mea-
sures by enforcing contract provisions that have antigaming provisions or by
refusing to enforce contracts that are induced through fraud or manipula-
tion (i.e., gaming).  Popular antigaming contractual provisions in social net-
works are those that enforce “real name” policies (most prominently applied
by Facebook)—rules that require users to identify themselves using their real
name, and in that way bar them from gaming systems by creating multiple
personas or misrepresenting their identities.186  Similar measures were intro-
duced by Amazon to battle self-interested reviews of products (both self-
praise and competitor bashing).187
Even apart from legal restrictions on deceit, American law often limits
gameability.  For example, the Fair Credit Reporting Act is a blend of privacy
and antigaming rules.  On one hand, collections of information that consti-
tute credit reports cannot be accessed by companies unless the company sat-
isfies one of a discrete set of conditions that satisfy an authorized purpose.
This is the privacy part of the law.188  Gaming is further promoted by rules
requiring the disclosure of the logic behind the credit score formation—the
four leading factors that adversely affected one’s credit report.189  Such infor-
mation can clearly be subsequently used to game the system.  But the upshot
for businesses, and the downside for would-be gamers, is that if a company is
using a credit report for one of the authorized purposes, then it can access
the report without the consent of the subject.190  Moreover, the statute uses
immunities from otherwise applicable civil liability in order to entice third-
party creditors to report past information about the subject.  These provi-
sions of the FCRA statute create an antigaming set of rules by allowing pro-
183 See id. § 1348.
184 Laws also might outlaw those promoting gaming and facilitating it, such as the pros-
ecution of those training individuals to “beat the polygraph.”  Roth, supra note 97, at 1256
(citing Drake Bennett, Man vs. Machine: The True Story of an Ex-Cop’s War on Lie Detectors,
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Aug. 4, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2015-doug-wil-
liams-war-on-lie-detector/).
185 See, e.g., Lanham Act §§ 1–45, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1127 (2012).
186 See Tal Z. Zarsky & Norberto Nuno Gomes de Andrade, Regulating Electronic Identity
Intermediaries: The “Soft eID” Conundrum, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1335, 1351–53 (2013).
187 See Greene, supra note 88; Streitfeld, supra note 87.
188 15 U.S.C. § 1681b (2012).
189 Id. § 1681(d). But see PASQUALE, supra note 1, at 4.
190 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b).  If the company decides to take an adverse action against the
subject, however, it must notify him. Id. § 1681b(3).
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spective creditors and employers to receive detailed information about their
applicants from a variety of sources without having to rely on the applicant’s
own reporting or consent to access.  With additional sources at their disposal,
successful gaming is much more difficult.
Outside the formal context of credit reporting, peoples’ reputations are
reflected or manufactured (depending on one’s perception of the process’s
legitimacy) by companies like Google and Yelp.  A cottage industry has devel-
oped around gaming the algorithms used by important intermediaries.
Google’s algorithm is the raison d’eˆtre for the search engine optimization
(SEO) industry and reputation firms.  But Google, Yelp, and other
intermediaries are aware of SEO tactics and use many countergaming strate-
gies to improve accuracy, and the law is sympathetic to these efforts.  Firms
use reduced transparency (indeed, they treat their algorithms as trade secrets
for multiple reasons), and consequently the rules of the algorithm are not
clear to gamers.  Firms also use complexity and frequent changes to con-
stantly tweak the algorithm and make it more resistant to gaming.  One inter-
mediary—Ripoff Report—refuses to remove any unfavorable reviews even
when the author wants to delete them in order to avoid strategic behavior by
companies that file defamation lawsuits or pressure authors in other ways.191
The First Amendment, the federal Communications Decency Act,192 and
court rulings upholding strict choice-of-law and forum selection provisions
have protected intermediaries from the threat of removal orders.193  They
have also protected intermediaries from demands to disclose their inner
workings, giving them the opacity to vigorously engage in these countergam-
ing strategies.194
C. Laws Eliminating the Need for Gaming
Finally, recall that one of our initial premises was that there was nothing
inherently wrong or unethical about discriminating between subjects to opti-
mize the distribution of some sort of resource or burden.  There are well-
known instances when the means of discrimination—the factors used—are
illegal and immoral (e.g., the use of race, sex, or national origin as factors
when the key variable has little or nothing to do with those demographics.)
But a lawmaker could also determine that social welfare is enhanced by disal-
lowing discrimination and forcing all or a class of subjects to be pooled
191 Chris Silver Smith, Is Ripoff Report Subverting Google Take-Downs?, SEARCH ENGINE
LAND (Apr. 19, 2017), https://searchengineland.com/ripoff-report-subverting-google-take-
downs-273440.
192 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
193 See Hassell v. Bird, 420 P.3d 776 (Cal. 2018) (holding that Yelp may refuse to
remove defamatory posting).  For cases upholding choice-of-law provisions, see Feldman v.
Google, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 229 (E.D. Pa. 2007); Yelp, Inc. v. Hadeed Carpet Cleaning,
Inc., 770 S.E.2d 440, 444 (Va. 2015).
194 See 47 U.S.C. § 230; Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457, 2003
WL 21464568, at *1–5 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003) (finding Google’s page ranking to be an
expression of opinion, thus freeing Google to exercise ranking at their discretion).
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together and treated the same.  And this could be motivated in part to avoid
the inefficiencies and distributional effects of gaming.
For example, before the Affordable Care Act went into effect, health
insurers had great incentive to assess the current health of their members
and to discover preexisting health conditions and predisposed risks so that
patients with higher risks could be charged higher premiums.  The incentive
to price the health risks accurately were so great that an insurer could ration-
ally invest effort to discover health conditions and propensities that the
patient himself did not know about.  Some potential means of investigation
were closed off by law long ago.  For example, the Genetic Information Non-
discrimination Act prohibits insurers from surreptitiously collecting their
patients’ genomic data to assess future health risks.195  But other means of
information collection are still open that simultaneously enable finer distinc-
tions by the algorithm designer and create new avenues for gaming.  Well-
ness programs, for example, give patients an opportunity to get perks (like
free Fitbits or sessions with a personal trainer) that serve dual purposes to
prevent avoidable health problems and to collect data about the patient’s
health and behavior.196  If participants are rewarded further for exercising
regularly or achieving certain goals like pedometer counts, some participants
will alter the inputs by misreporting their progress or by placing their Fitbits
on their dogs197—measures that are quickly met by technological advance-
ments and legal provisions striving to identify and block such gaming
attempts.198
The Affordable Care Act largely eliminated the incentives to carefully
assess each individual patient’s health by forcing insurers to offer plans at a
uniform price in any given geographic area regardless of the patient’s under-
lying health.199  This change had obvious benefits for the sick and similar
drawbacks for the healthy, and the propriety of this cross-subsidy (as well as
the cross-subsidies in the sources of payment) continues to be thrashed
around in public debate.200  But one clear result is that the compelled pool-
ing has rendered moot both the health insurance companies’ interests in
personal information to discriminate between patients and patients’ interests
in gaming the insurance pricing algorithms.
195 Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, § 101,
122 Stat. 881, 883–88 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. (2012)).
196 Marianne Levine, Obamacare’s ‘Wellness’ Gamble, POLITICO (May 13, 2016), https://
www.politico.com/agenda/agenda/story/2016/05/wellness-obamacare-000114.
197 Bachman, supra note 78.
198 See Jason Shaw, Not in Step: Why Caution Must Be Used When Adding Fitness Trackers to
Wellness Programs, LINKEDIN (June 22, 2016), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/step-why-
caution-must-used-when-adding-fitness-trackers-jason-shaw.
199 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1(a), 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2012).
200 There are actually two layers of cross-subsidization: one from the healthy to the sick,
but then another layer consisting of state grants and tax breaks that redistribute the costs
of health coverage from the lower middle class to the upper middle class and wealthy
through Medicaid expansion.  The pooling aspect that we discuss here—eliminating the
ability to price insurance plans based on preexisting conditions—affects the first layer.
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Similarly, provisions in the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility
and Disclosure Act of 2009 undermine credit card issuers’ ability to hike
credit rates in response to various previous transactions.201  Such a rule pools
together card holders who engage in a broad variety of transactions (such as
shopping for luxury goods or at discount stores) and thus renders gaming
efforts by card holders unnecessary.  It also means that, since credit card issu-
ers cannot discriminate between card holders after the terms have been
assigned, they may need to offer every card holder pool slightly worse terms
ex ante.
CONCLUSION
This Article has shown that gaming, and the dynamic process by which
both subjects and algorithms change in response to one another, is much
more important than would be suggested from the existing legal literature,
which largely treats gaming as a minor part of the algorithmic lifecycle or a
curious distraction in the theoretical foundation for regulating algorithms.
In fact, gaming and countergaming are a constant and consequential part of
decision-making systems.  Moreover, the law already regulates gaming in
direct and indirect ways, though it has done so in an ad hoc, nonreflective
way.
None of the examples from existing law discussed in Part III are per se
objectionable, nor are they self-evidently beyond dispute.  The laws promot-
ing gaming serve autonomy interests, and some of them also serve societal
interests in the distributional effects of an algorithm when gaming can
reduce the disparate effects on key groups of subjects.  They may even pro-
mote efficiency if a law’s protection of gaming prevents or substantially
deters an endless series of countermoves that keeps all parties engaged in the
management of the algorithm’s outcomes.  But they come at costs to accu-
racy.  They are also insensitive to whatever distributional effects the gamers
may impose on others.  Laws that reduce gaming usually have accuracy as
their goal.  But they, too, manage tradeoffs between the other values that are
affected by gaming (such as autonomy, distributional effects, and system inef-
ficiencies) without explicit recognition of the tradeoffs.
Lawmakers should make their value hierarchies more transparent so
that they can be challenged where the tradeoff does not match democratic
expectations or common sense, and so that the law can develop in a more
internally consistent way.  The discussion set out in this Article presents the
basic tools for lawmakers and regulators to do so, and for scholars to examine
and critique.
201 Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 § 171, 15
U.S.C. § 1666i-1 (2012); CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CARD ACT REPORT 27 (2013),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201309_cfpb_card-act-report.pdf.
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